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INTRODUCTION 
According to the United States Department of Education and 
most education communities, school-age children with disabilities in 
the United States are to be guaranteed a free and appropriate public 
education (FAPE).1 Congress enacted FAPE in the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).2 Despite this guarantee, some 
schools struggle to implement proper special education.3 Consider the 
following hypothetical illustration about Smith Elementary School 
and its interpretation of FAPE under IDEA:4 
Smith Elementary School in Michigan has two buildings to accommodate 
its large student population. The kindergarten, first grade, and second 
grade classrooms at Smith Elementary School are all in building A. The 
third grade through fifth grade classrooms at the school are in building B. 
Both buildings have self-contained special education classrooms, which are 
classrooms in the general education building consisting only of students 
with disabilities.5 Due to arbitrary placement decisions, some third, fourth, 
and fifth grade students with disabilities are educated in a self-contained 
                                                   
 1. See, e.g., Free Appropriate Public Education for Students with 
Disabilities: Requirements under Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Aug. 2010), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ 
edlite-FAPE504.html [https://perma.cc/DP25-64HK] (explaining that “regardless of 
the nature or severity” of the disability, school districts must “provide a ‘free 
appropriate public education’”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012) (enacting 
FAPE). FAPE does not usually include children that are not a typical school age. See 
id. For an understanding of special education voucher programs for private schooling, 
see generally Marie Rauschenberger, Resolving the Lack of Private-School 
Accountability in State-Funded Special Education Voucher Programs, 2015 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1125. 
 2. See § 1412(a)(1)(A); Daniel H. Melvin II, The Desegregation of Children 
with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 619 (1995) (explaining that “IDEA . . . 
conditions receipt of funds on meeting specified obligations”). In Board of Education 
v. Rowley, the Supreme Court ruled that for schools to meet FAPE requirements, the 
special education simply must “confer some educational benefit” on the student. 458 
U.S. 176, 200 (1982). Later, the Supreme Court articulated a slightly more specific 
standard for FAPE: for a school to “meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a 
school must offer an individual education plan (IEP) reasonably calculated to enable 
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. 
ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017). 
 3. See Interview with Heather Hall, Dir. of Advocacy, Advocates for Basic 
Legal Equality (July 2017) (providing the hypothetical below based on a true scenario 
of a school’s failure to implement IDEA); see also infra Section II.B (describing 
courts’ decisions about schools’ interpretations of IDEA). 
 4. This hypothetical is based off an analogous situation at an elementary 
school in Toledo, Ohio. See Interview with Heather Hall, supra note 3. 
 5. See JOHN WILLIAM COLLINS & NANCY P. O’BRIEN, THE GREENWOOD 
DICTIONARY OF EDUCATION 419 (Nancy Patricia O’Brien ed., 2d ed. 2011) (defining 
self-contained classrooms). 
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classroom in building A without participating in lunch, recess, gym, or any 
other nonacademic courses with peers in building B. These students have 
no interactions with their nondisabled, same-age peers, but interact only 
with kindergarten, first grade, and second grade students, which 
contradicts IDEA’s mainstreaming requirements and discounts the 
nonacademic benefits students receive by interacting with their nondisabled 
peers.6 
IDEA mandates that children with disabilities may only be 
removed from their regular educational environments when education 
in regular settings cannot be achieved satisfactorily.7 This mandate is 
known as a child’s least restrictive environment,8 commonly known 
as LRE in education communities.9 IDEA requires a continuum of 
alternative placements ranging from least restrictive regular 
classrooms to the most restrictive institutionalization.10 As part of this 
                                                   
 6. Interview with Heather Hall, supra note 3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) 
(2012) (explaining the need for mainstreaming students with disabilities); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d sub nom. See also 
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting 
the language and behavior model benefits for students with disabilities from 
nondisabled students); Melvin, supra note 2, at 646 (“[S]chools are barred from 
making placement decisions based on the general perception that a ‘segregated 
institution is academically superior for a [disabled] child.’ While the Act may 
contemplate the need for more restrictive placements than the regular education 
classroom, nothing in the Act contemplates that any particular disability is a legitimate 
basis for segregating children. Only if the individual child cannot be satisfactorily 
educated in the regular classroom is the child to be excluded. Thus, regardless of the 
child’s disability, the child should be educated in the regular education classroom 
unless it is determined by the IEP team that the child’s unique educational needs 
cannot be met there with the provision of supplemental aids and services.” (quoting 
Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983))). For a list of cases that 
evince the preference for education alongside nondisabled peers, see Melvin, supra 
note 2, at 647 n.360. “The all-important implication of this conclusion is that school 
districts should consider placing children with disabilities in the regular education 
classroom before exploring other more restrictive alternatives.” Id. at 649. 
 7. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with 
disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, 
are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such 
that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services 
cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).  
 8. See id. (defining least restrictive environments). 
 9. See, e.g., Letter from Melody Musgrove, Dir., Office of Special Educ. 
Programs, U.S. Dep’t Educ., to Colleague (Feb. 29, 2012), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/preschoollre22912.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QSD9-AX9J] (using LRE as an acronym for least restrictive 
environment). 
 10. See 3 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL § 11:87 (2018) (illustrating that placements range from regular education 
classrooms to special classes). 
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continuum, schools must also provide supplementary services to 
students.11 Unfortunately, as increased enrollment in schools has led 
to overcrowding, educational resources have not always expanded 
with the increased number of students.12 This overcrowding can lead 
to problems like the arbitrary segregation at Smith Elementary 
School.13 
In applying LREs under IDEA, circuit courts have created 
different tests to decide placements on the continuum.14 However, the 
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of intra-school segregation 
of special education students, nor has it addressed whether the phrase 
“non-disabled peers” is supposed to mean same-age peers.15 This 
Comment addresses these issues by proposing that, on the continuum 
of placements, schools must differentiate between self-contained 
classrooms in segregated buildings that do not allow students to 
interact with same-age peers and self-contained classrooms in a 
building of same-age peers.16 If a student’s unique needs somehow 
only permit an LRE in a separate building from the student’s peers, 
the school must explain that placement based on an educational 
                                                   
 11. See id. (explaining children should be segregated into special classes if 
supplementary services are unsuccessful). 
 12. See Susan Opotow, Rationalities and Levels of Analysis in Complex 
Social Issues: The Examples of School Overcrowding and Poverty, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 
135, 145 (2006) (explaining overcrowding and poverty). 
 13. See, e.g., id. (describing the relationship between overcrowding and 
poverty). 
 14. See ELENA M. GALLEGOS, LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT (LRE) 4-
14 (2010), https://www.bie.edu/cs/groups/xbie/documents/text/idc-008303.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LFM7-CPTS] (explaining each circuit’s test for least restrictive 
environments). 
 15. See id. (explaining the only existing tests for LREs, which do not include 
any Supreme Court decisions). 
 16. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL, supra note 10, at § 11:86 (explaining the continuum of services). Courts 
typically defer to the school administration’s decisions regarding placements because 
of the lack of judicial knowledge on the subject. See also R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184 (2d Cir. 2012). In Campbell v. Talladega County Board of 
Education, an 18-year-old student had “virtually no contact with nonhandicapped 
students outside of his lunch period[,]” and the court held that “significantly increased 
contact” with nondisabled peers was “essential to provide [the child] with role models 
and to increase his capacity to act independently.” 518 F. Supp. 47, 55-56 (N.D. Ala. 
1981). The court suggested for the school to move the student’s self-contained 
classroom “into the main high school building nearby or [] educat[e] both disabled 
and nondisabled children in the building that housed only special education classes at 
the time of trial.” Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), 
Least Restrictive Environment Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq., 189 A.L.R. FED. 297 (2003) (citing 
Campbell, 518 F. Supp. at 47). 
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methodology.17 Schools cannot arbitrarily place some self-contained 
classes in separate buildings away from students’ same-age peers.18 
This arbitrary separation limits proper mainstreaming and violates 
constitutional due process.19 
Part I of this Comment explains the development of IDEA and 
the different least restrictive environments.20 It also describes the 
history of special education laws and some of the leading circuit court 
tests for least restrictive environments.21 Part II presents the current 
legal challenges and varied scholarly views about the continuum of 
least restrictive environments and mainstreaming.22 Part III analyzes 
the benefits and shortcomings of ensuring that students with 
disabilities are mainstreamed to the maximum extent possible.23 
Finally, Part IV presents a solution and proposal for a new Supreme 
Court test about mainstreaming as required by IDEA.24  
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAWS 
In the 1970s, Congress sought to remedy the fact that a 
substantial portion of students with disabilities failed to receive an 
adequate education in public schools.25 Parents of children with 
                                                   
 17. See Linda S. Abrahamson, The Probative Weight of the 
“Mainstreaming” Requirement under the EHA, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 93, 129 (1991) 
(“[T]he Court should require that school districts support their decisions to offer only 
segregated or centralized programs as reasonable choices of educational 
methodology.”). 
 18. See id. (explaining the need for schools to make decisions based on 
educational methodology). 
 19. See US CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) 
(explaining the need to mainstream students with disabilities).  
 20. See infra Part I (describing the development of IDEA); see also § 
1412(a)(5)(A) (discussing least restrictive environments). 
 21. See infra Part I (describing the history of special education laws and 
leading circuit tests). See generally Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 
14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (implementing an LRE test); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of 
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989) (implementing an LRE test); Roncker v. Walter, 
700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) (implementing an LRE test). 
 22. See infra Part II (presenting scholarly views about mainstreaming). 
 23. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 125-27 (discussing critiques of 
mainstreaming); Melvin, supra note 2, at 642, 649-55 (explaining problems 
associated with modifying the regular classroom); infra Part III (analyzing 
mainstreaming). 
 24. See infra Part IV (proposing a new Supreme Court test); see also § 
1412(a)(5)(A) (explaining the mainstreaming requirement). 
 25. See Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 
IDEA Amendments and Federal Regulations, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 543, 545 (1999) 
(discussing how Congress enacted IDEA to remedy the exclusion of “millions of 
children from public instruction based solely upon their disabilities”); Melvin, supra 
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disabilities relied on Brown v. Board of Education to argue that their 
children were constitutionally entitled to education under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 
Further, parents argued that the arbitrary segregation of students with 
disabilities into separate classrooms and buildings denied students the 
procedural safeguards guaranteed in the Constitution.27 As a solution 
to the education disparities and the “constitutional dimension” of this 
issue, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act (EAHCA) in 1975, now known as IDEA.28 Circuit courts have 
applied a few main tests for least restrictive environments under 
IDEA,29 and courts within those jurisdictions have subsequently 
developed more specific interpretations of these LRE tests.30 Parents 
wishing to challenge LRE placements must follow certain procedural 
requirements.31 
                                                   
note 2, at 603 (explaining that in 1969, “only seven states were educating more than 
fifty-one percent of their disabled children”). 
 26. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 605-06 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 495 (1954)) (explaining parents’ reliance on Brown v. Board of Education 
to argue against the segregation of their children with disabilities). 
 27. See id. at 603 (detailing the exclusion of students with disabilities from 
the regular classroom). “Due process protections were enacted in part to assure that 
every child with a disability is ‘in fact’ afforded an education in the ‘least restrictive 
environment.’ Further, segregating students on the basis of a disability involves 
labeling children, a practice which itself poses a threat to individual liberty.” Id. at 
648. 
 28. See Crockett, supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412 (2012); Melvin, supra note 2, at 616 (“The legislative history evinces 
Congress’s view that desegregating children with disabilities is a matter of 
constitutional dimension. The drafters of the Act were concerned about the threat to 
individual liberty posed by risks of mislabeling, placement in needlessly restrictive 
environments, and the attendant stigma that would attach.”).  
 29. For the three main LRE tests, see generally Sacramento City Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 
874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 30. See Tucker v. Calloway Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 
1998) (discussing same-age peer interactions); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 
1207 (3d Cir. 1993) (“We construe IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement to prohibit a 
school from placing a child with disabilities outside of a regular classroom if 
educating the child in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support 
services, can be achieved satisfactorily.”); Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 
551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining the need for even partial mainstreaming); Jason 
O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744, 772 (N.D. Ill. 2016), vacated 
as moot sub nom. Ostby v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 851 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(holding in District Court that the school did not violate IDEA because the student 
was mainstreamed for lunch and recess as much as possible).  
30 See Tucker, 136 F.3d. at 506 (discussing the need for integration with peers of one’s 
own age). 
 31. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182-83 (1982) (summarizing 
the procedural requirements of IDEA). 
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A. Least Restrictive Environments and the Main Circuit Tests for 
Mainstreaming  
Congress deliberately wrote the LRE provision of IDEA 
ambiguously to allow for open interpretation.32 However, Congress, 
educators, and scholars still believe that the regular classroom is an 
optimal placement for students with disabilities.33 Thus, an optimal 
placement includes a regular classroom in the regular building with a 
student’s same-age peers.34 Despite the general preference for 
education in regular classrooms, IDEA requires schools to provide 
students with disabilities with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) 
that analyzes each student’s individual needs for certain educational 
goals and environments.35 This IEP is supposed to prioritize a 
student’s needs over convenience for schools.36 When composing 
IDEA, Congress focused not only on the needs of children with 
disabilities, but also on the benefits of integration for children without 
                                                   
 32. See Crockett, supra note 25, at 547 (explaining the brief and vague nature 
of the LRE provision in § 1412(a)(5)(A)). 
 33. See id. at 553 (“Congress . . . viewed the regular classroom as the optimal 
setting but acknowledged that instruction would need to be offered in multiple 
environments if individual needs were to be appropriately met. In 1997, when 
amending the statute, Congress similarly recognized that decisions for students with 
disabilities are to be based on individual need but called for justification in the IEP 
when decisions require an alternative placement to regular classes.”); infra Section 
II.A (describing scholarly views); see also N.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Stratford Bd. of Educ., 
97 F. Supp. 2d 224, 233 (D. Conn. 2000). Mainstreaming has benefits for students 
with disabilities beyond academics. See N.S. ex rel. P.S., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (stating 
that the student “had enjoyed some degree of success as a result of peer modeling, 
sensory integration activities, and supplemental instruction”). 
 34. See Sch. Dist. v. Grover, 755 F. Supp. 243, 247 (E.D. Wis. 1990) 
(discussing how “it was essential for [a student’s] social development that she interact 
with age-appropriate non-handicapped peers”); Crockett, supra note 25, at 553 
(explaining optimal education placements). The Supreme Court has not reviewed any 
placement test decisions, but it did recently enumerate a standard for students with 
disabilities in the general classroom. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. 
Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017) (“When a child is fully integrated in the 
regular classroom, as the Act prefers, what that typically means is providing a level 
of instruction reasonably calculated to permit advancement through the general 
curriculum.”).  
 35. See Crockett, supra note 25, at 559 (explaining that “[t]he extent to which 
each child will participate in academic or non-academic activities is to be specifically 
prescribed for the child in his or her written individualized educational program so 
that he or she can benefit from instruction in the least restrictive appropriate 
placement . . . [because p]lacement decisions are to be child-centered, not system-
centered”). 
 36. See id. at 561 (explaining that LRE placements are made on a case-by-
case basis, but the regular classroom is generally the starting point for consideration).  
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disabilities.37 By including students with disabilities in the general 
education environment, nondisabled students would grow to 
understand their differences and respect students and members of 
society with disabilities.38 
Under the LRE provision and dependent upon their individual 
needs, students with disabilities can be either entirely mainstreamed, 
mainstreamed only for part of the day, or not mainstreamed at all.39 
While in the mainstream, regular classroom, students can have special 
services, or they can leave for certain portions of the day to receive an 
education in a “resource room.”40 Some students need to be separated 
from their peers for most of the day, but they may join their 
                                                   
 37. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 617 (“Notably, members of Congress 
believed that educating disabled children with non-disabled children would have as 
much effect on children without disabilities as it would on children with disabilities. 
Senator Stafford, a sponsor of the Act, wrote of the disabled child’s ‘invisibility’ — 
kept out of sight, and when seen by others, seen not as an individual, but as a 
manifestation of a disabling condition. Once disabled children are mainstreamed, it 
was hoped, other children would come to see the disabled children as having a 
disability, not as a disability. Children would grow up realizing that their peers with 
disabilities are ‘neither threatening nor evil.’” (quoting Mark C. Weber, The 
Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 364 (1990))). 
 38. See id. (explaining Congress’s hopes for nondisabled children to better 
understand their peers with disabilities). Congress also had economic incentives for 
inclusivity. See id. at 618 (“Congress viewed the prevalence of dependency and 
unproductivity among the adult disabled population as a problem that begins in the 
schools. Artificial barriers to the full participation of individuals with disabilities not 
only perpetuate the stigma and indignity of institutionalization and dependency, but 
impose substantial financial burdens on families and ultimately society as a whole. 
Consequently, Congress believed that money spent on educating children with 
disabilities to be self-sufficient adult members of society would be more humane, and 
less expensive to society than maintaining such persons as welfare dependents or in 
institutions.”). Congress believed in certain benefits for both nondisabled students and 
students with disabilities: 
[A] disabled child brings a different perspective to the classroom. The child 
may model a degree of determination in the face of adversity that will 
inspire classmates. A non-disabled child who suffers a disabling illness or 
injury may be assisted by the experience of having had successfully 
functioning disabled peers.  
Melvin, supra note 2, at 656-57. 
 39. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., When Has a School District Met Its Obligation 
to Mainstream Handicapped Students Under the EHA?, 58 EDUC. L. REP. 445, 446 
(1990) (describing the levels of mainstreaming). 
 40. See id. A resource room is a “[c]lassroom in which students with 
exceptional learning needs receive individualized services for part of the school day.” 
Glossary, IRIS CTR., https://iris.peabody.vanderbilt.edu/glossary/ 
[https://perma.cc/KS9Z-7LUH] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
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nondisabled peers for certain nonacademic activities.41 The 
congressional intent of the LRE provision is for students to be 
removed from mainstream environments only when their conditions 
are so severe that mainstreaming offers no benefit to the student and 
burdens other students.42 Without guidance from the Supreme Court, 
jurisdictions have followed their own tests or adopted the tests of other 
jurisdictions to determine students’ LREs.43 However, none of the tests 
explicitly address mainstreaming with same-age peers.44 The main 
                                                   
 41. See 7 C.F.R. § 15b.23(b) (2018) (“In providing or arranging for the 
provision of nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities, including meals, 
recess periods, and the services and activities set forth in §15b.26(a)(2), a recipient 
shall ensure that handicapped persons participate with nonhandicapped persons in 
such activities and services to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the 
handicapped person in question.”); Osborne, supra note 39, at 446 (“Students with 
more severe handicaps may receive the major portion of their instruction in a special 
education class, but may join their nonhandicapped peers for lunch, recess, and other 
nonacademic activities. Students who are profoundly handicapped, or whose 
handicapping condition would present a significant disruption to the regular education 
environment may not be mainstreamed at all.”).  
 42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (stating that removal “from the 
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily”); Melvin, supra 
note 2, at 617 (discussing Congress’s thoughts on the positive effects of 
mainstreaming on students with disabilities and nondisabled students). See, e.g., M.A. 
ex rel. G.A. v. Voorhees Twp. Bd. of Educ., 202 F. Supp. 2d 345, 369-70 (D.N.J. 
2002), aff’d, 65 F. App’x 404 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a segregated placement was 
the LRE for a child who disrupted the regular classroom by having tantrums, 
assaulting students and teachers, and randomly leaving the classroom). While IDEA 
does not include traditional burdens of proof, other child welfare laws do include a 
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27 
(2016) (“The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or 
issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child 
unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of 
the child.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that states must 
adhere to at least a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof for termination of 
parental rights). 
 43. See GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 4-14 (explaining the LRE tests in each 
jurisdiction). 
 44. See id. Courts have considered some common factors in placement 
decisions: 
[S]ix regulatory provisions . . . have traditionally guided placement 
decisions . . . . (1) a continuum of alternative placements must be made 
available by a school district; (2) consideration must be given to any 
potential harmful effect on the child or his or her quality of service by a 
district in making placement decisions; (3) placement must be based on the 
IEP and determined at least annually. Three more LRE requirements are 
considered qualified, that is, they are preferences to be implemented to an 
extent indicated: (4) students with disabilities must be educated with their 
nondisabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate; (5) their removal 
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tests are the Sixth Circuit’s Roncker test,45 the Fifth Circuit’s Daniel 
R.R. test,46 and the Ninth Circuit’s Rachel H. test.47 Jurisdictions differ 
on which test to apply for LRE placements, but the most prominent 
tests emanated from Roncker v. Walter and Daniel R.R. v. State Board 
of Education.48 
1. The Roncker Test for Least Restrictive Environments  
In Roncker, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that if 
schools decide that a segregated placement for a student is superior, 
the court must decide if the school could feasibly provide those same 
services from the segregated placement in the regular classroom.49 If 
the school could provide the services in the regular setting, the school 
has violated IDEA.50 Courts may consider certain factors to determine 
the feasibility of placements,51 such as: (1) the potential benefits of 
mainstreaming;52 (2) the benefits of services not available in the 
                                                   
from the regular education environment can only occur when the nature or 
severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the 
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily; 
(6) unless the IEP requires otherwise, the student should attend a 
neighborhood school, or if a non neighborhood placement is indicated, this 
should be as close to home as possible.  
Crockett, supra note 25, at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(implementing an LRE test); GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 4 (describing the Roncker 
test for LRE). 
 46. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 
1989) (implementing an LRE test); GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 6-8 (describing the 
Daniel R.R. test for LRE). 
 47. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 
(9th Cir. 1994) (implementing an LRE test); GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 10-12 
(describing the Rachel H. test for LRE). 
 48. See GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 4-15 (listing the jurisdictions that 
adopted the Roncker and Daniel R.R. tests). For the main LRE tests see Roncker, 700 
F.2d at 1063; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. 
 49. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (“In a case where the segregated facility 
is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make 
that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they 
can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act.”); 
Melvin, supra note 2, at 630 (describing the Roncker test). 
 50. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 630 (explaining that if education is feasible 
in regular classrooms, segregation is inappropriate). 
 51. See id. (discussing the requirements of the Roncker test). 
 52. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (“[S]ome handicapped children simply 
must be educated in segregated facilities . . . because the handicapped child would not 
benefit from mainstreaming.”); see also Melvin, supra note 2, at 630 (listing the 
Roncker factors). 
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mainstream;53 (3) the disruptiveness of the student;54 and (4) the 
potential costs of mainstreaming.55 However, cost is no defense if the 
court finds that a school does not properly offer a continuum of 
placements.56 As the first main LRE test, three other circuits have 
either adopted Roncker or expanded the test, applying their own 
factors to determine students’ LRE placements.57 
                                                   
 53. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (explaining that some students with 
disabilities must be “educated in segregated facilities . . . because any marginal 
benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from 
services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting”); see also 
Melvin, supra note 2, at 630 (listing the Roncker factors). 
 54. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (explaining that separation may be proper 
if “the handicapped child is a disruptive force in the non-segregated setting”); see also 
Melvin, supra note 2, at 630 (listing the Roncker factors). 
 55. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (citing Age v. Bullit Cty. Sch., 673 F.2d 
141, 145 (6th Cir. 1982)) (“Cost is a proper factor to consider since excessive 
spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped children.”); see also 
Melvin, supra note 2, at 630 (listing the Roncker factors). The federal government is 
supposed to “pay 40 percent of the average per student cost for every special education 
student. The current average per student cost is $7,552 and the average cost per special 
education student is an additional $9,369 per student, or $16,921.” Background of 
Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), NAT’L 
EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/19029.htm [https://perma.cc/W2NU-PMPK] 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2018). However, the federal government only provided “local 
school districts with just under 20 percent of its commitment” in 2004. Id. For detailed 
examples of states’ cost analyses of education, see generally AUGENBLICK, PALAICH 
& ASSOCIATES, MICHIGAN EDUCATION FINANCE STUDY (2016), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/ 
Michigan_Education_Finance_Study_527806_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6V6-
JW6L]; AUGENBLICK, PALAICH & ASSOCIATES, COSTING OUT THE RESOURCES NEEDED 
TO MEET PENNSYLVANIA’S PUBLIC EDUCATION GOALS (2007), 
http://www.stateboard.education.pa.gov/Documents/Research%20Reports%20and%
20Studies/PA%20Costing%20Out%20Study%20rev%2012%2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XRN5-UH63]; AUGENBLICK, PALAICH AND ASSOCIATES, UPDATE TO 
COLORADO COSTING OUT STUDY (2013), https://www.greateducation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/CostingOutUpdateReport2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/J85T-
XE3P]. 
 56. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 631 (explaining that if a school fails to 
provide a continuum of services, it cannot use cost as a defense); see also Cedar 
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1999) 
(“[IDEA] may not require public schools to maximize the potential of disabled 
students commensurate with the opportunities provided to other children, and the 
potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be relevant to arriving 
at a sensible construction of the IDEA. But Congress intended ‘to open the door of 
public education’ to all qualified children and ‘require[d] participating States to 
educate handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible.’” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 
(1982))). 
 57. See GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 4-14 (describing each circuit’s tests for 
LREs). The Eighth Circuit and Fourth Circuit use the Roncker test. See id. at 4-5. The 
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2. The Daniel R.R. Test for Least Restrictive Environments 
The Fifth Circuit applied its own test in Daniel R.R. without 
considering feasibility factors, finding that the Roncker test intruded 
too far into schools’ policy decisions.58 First, the Daniel R.R. test asks 
if students can satisfactorily receive an education in regular 
classrooms with the help of supplemental services.59 If the answer is 
no, the court then considers whether the school has mainstreamed the 
student as much as possible.60 In Daniel R.R., the court applied four 
additional factors in reaching its decision.61 The court asked: (1) 
whether the school made more than token efforts to educate a student 
in the regular environment;62 (2) whether the student received any 
educational benefit from mainstreaming;63 (3) whether a segregated 
setting better served the student’s unique needs;64 and (4) whether the 
student had any negative impact on other students in the regular 
                                                   
Ninth Circuit combines Roncker with Daniel R.R. to form its own test. See id. at 11. 
However, the Eleventh Circuit follows the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test, see id. at 8-
9, and the Tenth Circuit follows a slightly modified version of the Daniel R.R. test, 
see id. at 14.  
 58. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048; Melvin, supra note 2, at 631 (“[T]he 
court declined to adopt the Roncker feasibility test, contending that the Roncker test 
was too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy choices of educators.”). 
 59. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048 (“First, we ask whether education in 
the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved 
satisfactorily for a given child.”). 
 60. See id. (“If it cannot and the school intends to provide special education 
or to remove the child from regular education, we ask, second, whether the school has 
mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.”). 
 61. See id. (applying additional factors).  
 62. See id. (asking whether the school made more than token efforts to 
mainstream); Melvin, supra note 2, at 632 (“First, the court looked to see if the school 
had taken more than token steps to accommodate Daniel’s needs in the regular 
education classroom through the provision of supplementary aids and services. 
Though the court stated that the requirement to accommodate is broad, it does not 
require the teacher to act as a special education teacher in a regular education class. 
Nor is the school expected to so radically modify the curriculum that the child is 
receiving a special education in the regular education classroom. The court concluded 
that here the school had taken sufficient steps to accommodate Daniel’s disability—
the child’s teacher made ‘genuine and creative efforts to reach Daniel,’ modified his 
curriculum, and spent a disproportionate amount of her time attending to him.”) 
(quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050).  
 63. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 632 (“The court concluded that Daniel was 
receiving little, if any educational benefit from participation in regular pre-
kindergarten other than the ‘opportunity to associate with nonhandicapped students.’” 
(quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050)).  
 64. See id. (“Here, the court had no trouble concluding that the marginal 
social benefits Daniel received from mainstreaming were outweighed by the clear 
educational benefits he received from a self-contained special education program.”). 
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classroom.65 While the Daniel R.R. test is seemingly less intrusive  
than the Roncker test,66 neither test leaves room for courts to consider 
the positive effects of students with disabilities.67 
3. The Rachel H. Test for Least Restrictive Environments 
By combining factors from Roncker and Daniel R.R., the Ninth 
Circuit created its own LRE test in Sacramento City Unified School 
District v. Rachel H.68 The Rachel H. test considers: (1) the academic 
and nonacademic benefits a student receives in the regular 
classroom;69 (2) the effects of the student on the teacher and 
classmates;70 and (3) the costs of mainstreaming a student.71 At least 
one proponent of the multifactor Rachel H. analysis argues that it is 
superior to the LRE tests in Roncker and Daniel R.R. because it shifts 
the focus to the school’s ability to appropriately accommodate the 
student instead of focusing on the student’s disability.72 This argument 
emphasizes the idea that a school can control its ability to 
                                                   
 65. See id. at 633 (“Citing the regulations implementing the mainstreaming 
mandate, the court held that where a disabled ‘child is so disruptive in a regular 
classroom that the education of other students is significantly impaired,’ 
mainstreaming is not appropriate. Here, the court agreed with the school that the 
demand Daniel made on the teacher’s time was not fair to the other students. Taking 
all four factors into account, the court held that Daniel could not be educated 
satisfactorily in the regular classroom, and that mainstreaming him for lunch and 
recess satisfied the requirement to mainstream the child to the ‘maximum extent 
appropriate.’” (quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049, 1051)). 
 66. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048 (stating that the court’s “task is not to 
second-guess state and local policy decisions”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 631 
(explaining the intrusive nature of the Roncker test into educational policy decisions). 
 67. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 657-58 (explaining the effectiveness of 
considering the positive effects of inclusion on nondisabled students). 
 68. See GALLEGOS, supra note 14, at 10-12 (describing the Rachel H. test for 
LRE). See generally Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 
(9th Cir. 1994) (implementing an LRE test). 
 69. See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404 (“[T]he court considered . . . the 
educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class[,] . . . [and] the non-
academic benefits of such placement.”) 
 70. See id. (explaining that the court also considered “the effect Rachel had 
on the teacher and children in the regular class”). 
 71. See id. (explaining that the court also considered “the costs of 
mainstreaming Rachel”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 638 (“[T]he court affirmed the 
lower court decision upholding Rachel’s full-time placement in a regular 
classroom.”). 
 72. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 657 (“[T]he multifactor approach . . . 
appropriately shifts the focus of the placement decision away from the child’s 
disability, something over which the child has no control, to the capacity of the regular 
education program to accommodate the ‘differences’ presented by children with 
disabilities.”). 
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accommodate students, but students cannot control the fact that they 
have a disability.73 Unlike the Rachel H. test, the Roncker and Daniel 
R.R. LRE tests leave out a potentially crucial factor: the positive 
effects students with disabilities have on their nondisabled peers.74 The 
Rachel H. test does not explicitly state that positive effects on peers 
are a factor,75 but the test seemingly allows for a flexible analysis by 
not focusing exclusively on negative effects.76 Students with 
disabilities can inspire their peers and bring a diverse outlook into the 
regular classroom.77 In close cases, reviewing courts should favor 
inclusion with nondisabled peers.78  
B. Lower Courts’ Interpretations of Least Restrictive Environments 
and Mainstreaming 
Circuit courts have never had the benefit of an opinion from the 
Supreme Court on a universal test for mainstreaming and LREs; thus, 
                                                   
 73. See id. (explaining the proper focus should be on schools). The Roncker 
test only allows analysis into the “disruptiveness” of the student with disabilities, not 
any positive effects the student may have on his or her nondisabled peers. See supra 
notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The Daniel R.R. test similarly only analyzes 
disruptiveness instead of potential positive effects. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 633. 
 74. See id. at 656-57 (describing the benefits of students with disabilities on 
their nondisabled peers). 
 75. See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing the Rachel H. 
factors). The court simply asked about “the effect Rachel had on the teacher and 
children in the regular class.” Id.  
 76. See id. (listing the Rachel H. factors); see also Melvin, supra note 2, at 
657-58 (explaining the effectiveness of considering the positive effects of inclusion 
on nondisabled students). 
 77. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 657-58 (“Non-disabled children will 
hopefully come to understand and tolerate the differences presented by disabilities if 
they are given the opportunity to interact with disabled children. At the very least, 
non-disabled children can learn, first-hand, that the disabled have certain rights. 
Moreover, a disabled child brings a different perspective to the classroom. The child 
may model a degree of determination in the face of adversity that will inspire 
classmates. A non-disabled child who suffers a disabling illness or injury may be 
assisted by the experience of having had successfully functioning disabled peers.”). 
Further, the parents’ wishes and even potentially the children’s wishes deserve more 
deference and should be a factor in courts’ LRE analyses. See id. at 657 (“[C]ourts 
should remember the important role that Congress reserved for parents, guardians, 
and when appropriate, the children, themselves, in the placement decision. Parents 
and guardians, and when appropriate, their children or wards with disabilities, are 
guaranteed a place at the table where the placement decision is made.”). “[O]nly an 
individualized, fact-specific, and multifactor inquiry” is proper for reviewing the 
appropriateness of a child’s placement.” Id. at 658. 
 78. See id. (explaining that based on Congress’s preferences “courts 
reviewing the appropriateness of placement decisions should, in close cases, err on 
the side of inclusion, not exclusion, from the regular education classroom”). 
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a student in a segregated building, like at Smith Elementary School, 
may only receive opportunities to mainstream with his or her same-
age peers depending on that jurisdiction’s test.79 Despite this lack of 
clarity, the Supreme Court has stated that schools must mainstream 
students with their nondisabled peers to the maximum extent 
possible.80 Additionally, the Supreme Court specified that schools may 
only segregate students with disabilities from their regular classroom 
when their disability is so severe that education cannot be achieved in 
regular classes.81 A regular classroom setting implies a classroom with 
students’ same-age peers.82 Even if removal from the regular 
classroom is necessary, students usually must still be educated in the 
same school they would attend if they did not have disabilities.83 While 
this rule does not directly apply to different intra-school buildings, one 
can infer that a separate building is far more restrictive on the 
continuum than simply a separate classroom in the same school.84 
Several other lower courts have addressed mainstreaming and 
the appropriate amount of interaction with peers, including same-age 
peers.85 For example, courts have emphasized that, just because a 
                                                   
 79. See Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing 
Classroom Placement of Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. 
REV. 809, 809-10 (2002) (providing an example of the discrepancies that can occur 
without a uniform test). 
 80. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (“‘[T]o the maximum extent 
appropriate,’ [s]tates will ‘mainstream’ disabled children, i.e., that they will educate 
them with children who are not disabled . . . .” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) 
(2012))). 
 81. See id. (stating that schools “will segregate or otherwise remove such 
children from the regular classroom setting ‘only when the nature or severity of the 
handicap is such that education in regular classes . . . cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily’” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012))). 
 82. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(e) (2017) (“A child with a disability is not 
removed from education in age-appropriate regular classrooms solely because of 
needed modifications in the general education curriculum.” (emphasis added)); see 
also Melvin, supra note 2, at 647 (“This provision clearly evinces a strong 
Congressional preference for educating children with disabilities with their non-
disabled peers.”). 
 83. See § 300.116(c) (“Unless the IEP of a child with a disability requires 
some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school that he or she would attend 
if nondisabled . . . .”). 
 84. See id. (explaining the proper school placement for students with 
disabilities). Also, if parents challenge a placement, “the child shall remain in the 
then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial admission 
to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school 
program until all such proceedings have been completed.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(j) 
(West 2005). 
 85. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Educational 
Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 
523, 562-63 (1996) (explaining the trends and decisions in recent cases). 
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student is not progressing at the same academic and developmental 
level as his or her peers, schools are not entitled to further restrict that 
child’s placement.86 However, schools must set developmental and 
social goals particular to each student.87 If a student cannot reach those 
goals in the regular classroom, then a more restrictive special 
education setting could be proper.88 The following cases demonstrate 
the courts’ preference for even partial mainstreaming,89 the need for 
meaningful efforts to mainstream,90 the view that same-age peer 
interactions are significant,91 and the interpretation that special 
education students in separate buildings should at least be 
mainstreamed in nonacademic activities.92 
1. Partial Mainstreaming Is Better Than No Mainstreaming at 
All 
In 1991, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Gillette 
v. Fairland Board of Education that a school was not liable for 
educational expenses of dissatisfied parents who decided to remove 
their child from his public school to an entirely separate private school 
                                                   
 86. See id. at 563 (“A second theme in recent cases emphasized that school 
officials cannot condition a disabled child’s right to participate in the mainstream class 
on his or her ability to meet or keep up with peers’ academic or developmental 
progress.”).  
 87. See id. at 562 (“But the courts have stressed school officials must include 
developmental and social goals as a part of the decision to place a child in special 
education.”). 
 88. See id. (explaining that the goals are part of the analysis of whether to 
“place a child in special education”). 
 89. See Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(“Removing a child from a partially mainstreamed program at a public school, which 
otherwise provides an appropriate academic instruction and the only objection to that 
program was a failure to fully mainstream, and placing that child in a non-
mainstreamed program in a private school does not satisfy the goals of the Act.”). 
 90. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he 
district court’s finding that the School District has not taken meaningful steps to try 
to include Rafael [Plaintiff] in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and 
services is not clearly erroneous.”). 
 91. See Tucker v. Calloway Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“Moreover, although Barkley was six and one-half years old, at LCDC he had 
been in a class of three and one-half to four years olds. There was testimony that he 
needed integration with peers of his own age.”). 
 92. See Jason O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744, 772 
(N.D. Ill. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. Ostby v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 
851 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding in District Court that the school did not violate 
IDEA because the student was mainstreamed for lunch and recess as much as 
possible). 
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consisting mostly of students with disabilities.93 The issue the court 
faced was whether the child could receive an “appropriate” education 
in the public school.94 The private school the child attended only 
educated students with disabilities or students in need of remediation.95 
In contrast, the public school provided the child with opportunities to 
socialize with his nondisabled peers in several regular classes and at 
lunch.96 The court noted that in the private school, the child was in 
classes with students at his academic level, not his age level.97 
However, in the public school he progressed through grades with his 
same-age peers.98 While the court did not directly emphasize the 
importance of mainstreaming with same-age peers, it did include this 
evidence of same-age peer interaction in its reasoning that a partially 
mainstreamed program better served IDEA than an entirely non-
mainstreamed program.99 
                                                   
 93. See Gillette, 932 F.2d at 553-54 (discussing the facts that led the parents 
to remove their son from public school). 
 94. See id. at 552 (“If a state is unable to provide an appropriate education in 
its own schools, then it must provide the tuition for a private education at a school 
which is able to provide an appropriate education.”). 
 95. See id. at 554 (describing the types of students in the private school). 
 96. See id. (“The record indicates, however, that P.T. had more of an 
opportunity to engage in activities with nondisabled children at Fairland School, 
where he would have attended several non-LD classes as well as the normal lunch 
hour . . . .”). 
 97. See id. at 551-52 (explaining the types of children with which the student 
interacted). 
 98. See id. at 552. The inference of this progression is evident from 
comparing the student’s birthday—September 21, 1971—with the dates of the grades 
he was in. Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 343, 344 (S.D. Ohio 1989), 
rev’d, 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991). In a subsequent district court case, the court found 
that a school district’s “practice of ‘mainstreaming’ students with learning or 
behavioral disabilities [wa]s an appropriate, if not essential, element to fostering 
academic and social development.” Bd. of Educ. v. Patrick M., 9 F. Supp. 2d 811, 
825-26 (N.D. Ohio 1998). That school actively encouraged “contact with non-
learning disabled students.” Id. at 826. The student had difficulty with this 
mainstreaming, but his disabilities were not sufficient to “require private residential 
placement.” Id.  
 99. See Gillette, 932 F.2d at 554 (“Removing a child from a partially 
mainstreamed program at a public school, which otherwise provides an appropriate 
academic instruction and the only objection to that program was a failure to fully 
mainstream, and placing that child in a non-mainstreamed program in a private school 
does not satisfy the goals of the Act.”); see also Reese v. Bd. of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 
2d 1149, 1160 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (emphasizing the importance of exposing students 
with disabilities to the behavior of their nondisabled peers, stating that “[t]here was 
no evidence at the hearing that Spencer would have opportunities to be regularly 
exposed to the more appropriate behaviors of non-disabled peers”). The court found 
that the school “failed to provide Spencer with the opportunity to interact with 
nondisabled peers and benefit from exposure to positive behaviors . . . .” Id. at 1163.  
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2. Schools Must Make Meaningful Efforts to Mainstream 
Students 
In Oberti v. Board of Education, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed the placement of Rafael, a student with Down 
syndrome,100 and found that the school only made “negligible” 
efforts—not any meaningful efforts—to mainstream Rafael into the 
regular classroom.101 The court also emphasized that problems with 
modifying the regular classroom curriculum are “not a legitimate basis 
upon which to justify excluding a child[] unless the education of other 
students is significantly impaired.”102 In short, a student’s different 
learning style does not automatically justify segregation from the 
regular classroom.103 If schools can achieve effective education 
methods for the student in the regular classroom, segregation is 
improper.104 
                                                   
 100. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the placement of Rafael). 
 101. See id. at 1221 (discussing the school’s negligible efforts to mainstream); 
Melvin, supra note 2, at 636 (“Engaging in the first step of the Daniel R.R. inquiry, 
the court applied all three factors to the placement of Rafael Oberti. The court held 
that the district court’s findings that the school had not taken ‘meaningful steps’ to 
include Rafael in the regular classroom with supplementary aids and services was not 
‘clearly erroneous.’ The district court determined that the school district had made 
only negligible or perfunctory efforts to include Rafael in the regular classroom. For 
instance, one year Rafael was placed in a developmental kindergarten class without a 
curriculum plan, a behavior management plan, or adequate special education support 
to the teacher.” (quoting Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1221))). 
 102. Melvin, supra note 2, at 637 (quoting Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1222) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 103. See id. at 642 (“[T]he Oberti court concluded that ‘the fact that a child 
with disabilities will learn differently . . . within a regular classroom does not justify 
exclusion from that environment.’ Thus, the educational benefits that inclusion can 
confer on a disabled child should not be adjudged by reference to the child’s capacity 
to grasp the regular education curriculum, but rather, the child’s ability to make 
satisfactory progress toward the goals developed in his or her ‘individualized 
education program.’” (quoting Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217)). 
 104. See id. at 637 (“As to the second factor, a comparison of the benefits of a 
segregated versus non-segregated education, the court agreed with the trial court that 
the Oberti’s experts demonstrated that educational methods effective for teaching 
Rafael could be used in the regular classroom.”). 
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3. Same-Age Peer Interaction Is a Crucial Factor in 
Mainstreaming 
One case from the Sixth Circuit is particularly relevant to the 
issue of segregating students from same-age peers.105 In Tucker v. 
Calloway County Board of Education, the student’s parents strongly 
opposed public-school placement in a self-contained classroom.106 As 
a result, the parents enrolled their son in a private school, and the 
School District refused to reimburse the enrollment cost.107 The 
District wanted to place Barkley, a six-year-old student, in a self-
contained classroom with ten children who were between five and 
eight years old.108 At the private school, he was in a general education 
setting, but he had been in a class of three to four-year-old students.109 
The court stated that some testimony expressed that Barkley “needed 
integration with peers of his own age.”110 The Sixth Circuit considered 
his same-age peer interactions, among other factors, in ultimately 
deciding that the public-school placement would have been a FAPE 
under IDEA.111 Thus, despite the fact that a self-contained class is 
technically more restrictive on the continuum than a general education 
private school, the court recognized the importance of same-age peer 
interactions in deciding the true LRE for an individual student.112  
4. Students in Segregated Buildings for Special Education Can 
Still Be Mainstreamed 
Along with the importance of same-age peer interactions in 
mainstreaming,113 courts have also discussed the need to find virtually 
                                                   
 105. See Tucker v. Calloway Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 
1998) (discussing the importance of same-age peer interactions). 
 106. See id. at 498 (discussing the parents’ issues with their child’s 
placement). 
 107. See id. (describing the parents’ decision to remove their child from public 
education). 
 108. See id. at 506 (describing the school district’s placement proposal). 
 109. See id. (describing the makeup of Barkley’s private school class). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. (“The district court properly concluded that the school district’s 
proposed placement of Barkley in the special education classroom at North 
Elementary School was an appropriate placement within the meaning of a free 
appropriate public education.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 112. See id. (noting the important of same-age peer interactions). Placements 
range from “regular classes, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and 
instruction in hospitals and institutions.” AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE 
AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 10.  
 113. See Tucker, 136 F.3d at 506 (discussing the importance of same-age peer 
interactions). 
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all opportunities to mainstream students who are in segregated 
placements.114 For example, in Jason O. v. Manhattan School District, 
the Northern District of Illinois recently addressed the issue of 
students in self-contained classrooms in segregated buildings having 
opportunities to interact with nondisabled peers as much as possible.115 
This case was later vacated only because the parents and school came 
to an agreement to educate the child, Jacob, in the regular classroom.116  
In Jason O., the student’s parents were upset when the IEP team 
wanted to place Jacob in a self-contained program called SELF in a 
building that was 300 to 500 feet from the school.117 The court noted 
the importance of a least restrictive environment and explained that in 
SELF, Jacob would still interact with nondisabled peers in art, music, 
gym, lunch, recess, and some academic courses.118 The court did 
acknowledge the separation of buildings as a restriction on 
mainstreaming, but the separation was immaterial because Jacob 
would still interact with his peers during certain parts of the day in the 
main building.119 The parents were worried that their son would not 
have access to his nondisabled peers in the case of inclement 
weather.120 However, during inclement weather SELF used a van to 
transport students to the school.121 Thus, the court found the segregated 
SELF program to be a proper placement because Jacob would still be 
mainstreamed to the greatest extent possible, and his placement in the 
regular school did not benefit him.122 Unlike the Smith Elementary 
School example where students have no interactions with nondisabled 
peers in the main building, SELF did allow for these peer 
interactions.123 In cases where parents are unsatisfied with their 
                                                   
 114. See Jason O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744, 771-
72 (N.D. Ill. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. Ostby v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 
851 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining the issue of the case and the importance of 
mainstreaming in even nonacademic activities). 
 115. See id. (discussing opportunities to mainstream). 
 116. See Ostby, 851 F.3d at 682 (“The District and the Ostbys have reached 
an agreement regarding Jacob’s IEP and his placement in general education for third 
grade, and the District has no pending proposal to move Jacob to the SELF 
program.”). 
 117. See Jason O., 173 F. Supp. 3d at 758 (describing the SELF placement). 
 118. See id. at 772 (“Although structured, the SELF program does not wall-
off Jacob entirely from his nondisabled peers. Children in the program can interact 
with their nondisabled peers in multiple arenas, including in: (1) special area subjects 
(e.g., art, music and gym); (2) lunch and recess; and (3) academic classes, based upon 
Jacob’s emotional ability to handle those classes.”). 
 119. See id. (discussing Jacob’s interactions with peers). 
 120. See id. (explaining the parents’ concerns). 
 121. See id.  
 122. See id. (holding that SELF was a proper placement). 
 123. See id.  
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children’s placements, the parents have to follow certain procedural 
guidelines under IDEA to challenge schools’ decisions.124 
C. Procedural Requirements for IDEA 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees that no state can deprive a person “of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”125 States must comply with the 
procedural requirements of due process to receive federal funds under 
IDEA.126 First, schools must notify parents or guardians of children 
with disabilities about any proposed changes to their children’s 
education.127 Second, those parents must be allowed to bring a 
complaint about their children’s education or any proposed changed 
to it.128 Finally, those complaints must be resolved at a due process 
hearing.129 States or parents dissatisfied with the findings at those 
hearings can bring a civil action in state or federal district court.130  
However, due process is vital not only at the hearing stage but 
also during the formation of children’s IEPs.131 In order to comply with 
due process requirements, schools must collaborate with families in 
forming IEPs and provide individualized assessments and plans for 
each student.132 A lack of collaboration constitutes a per se violation 
of IDEA, but a lack of individualization requires further analysis.133 
Regardless, due process requires schools to focus on individual 
children’s specific needs rather than blanket school policies.134 Even 
with these due process requirements, several challenges can interfere 
                                                   
 124. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182-84 (1982) (explaining the 
procedural requirements under IDEA). 
 125. US CONST. amend. XIV. 
 126. See Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 at 182 (describing the funding requirements of 
IDEA). 
 127. See id. (setting forth the parents’ rights under IDEA). 
 128. See id. (explaining complaint procedures for parents). 
 129. See id. at 183 (stating that “appeal to the state educational agency must 
be provided if the initial hearing is held at the local or regional level”). 
 130. See id. (explaining procedures for parents).  
 131. See Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process 
in Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 446 (2011) (explaining the two 
layers of due process under IDEA – the due process hearing and due process in the 
formation of IEPs). 
 132. See id. at 449 (explaining families’ rights under IDEA). 
 133. See id. at 454 (discussing collaboration requirements). 
 134. See id. at 454-55 (describing the need for individualized analyses). 
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with mainstreaming,135 but scholars have proposed solutions to address 
some of these issues.136 
II. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MAINSTREAMING AND POTENTIAL 
SOLUTIONS  
Because of the individual needs of students, a building 
segregated from same-age peers might actually be the LRE for some 
students.137 However, one scholar explains that schools need to make 
educated, calculated decisions in all of their placements.138 Children 
with disabilities have unique needs and require individualized, special 
education that can conflict with inclusion at times.139 Another scholar 
has generally accepted that “appropriate” education under FAPE 
connotes that full inclusion may not always be feasible when students 
are disruptive or require too much of the teacher’s attention.140 
However, some commentators have different opinions on the meaning 
                                                   
 135. See infra Subsections II.A.1-II.A.3 (detailing scholars’ viewpoints about 
challenges with mainstreaming). 
 136. See infra Subsections II.B.1-II.B.2 (discussing scholars’ proposed 
solutions for issues related to mainstreaming). 
 137. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 85, at 541 (“Proponents of placement 
diversity acknowledge significant problems in the present special education system 
prevent many children with disabilities from obtaining an appropriate education. In 
their view, however, improvements in the system must continue to be based on 
educators’ individual determinations concerning each child’s needs, which, at some 
times, require placements in integrated settings, and at others, in separate settings.”). 
 138. See id. at 538 (“The inclusionists’ critique of the existing system begins 
with the view that teachers’ decisions to refer children to special education often lack 
a sound pedagogic basis and are usually symptomatic of the broader, structural 
deficiencies inherent in the dual special education/general education system. Under 
the present regime, they maintain, special education and general education teachers 
rarely collaborate, and this enforced isolation, together with inadequate professional 
development, and a limited array of instructional strategies available in most 
classrooms, induces many teachers inappropriately to refer too many students to 
special education.”). 
 139. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 643 (“The difficulty encountered in 
interpreting the IDEA stems in part from the tension courts and commentators have 
observed between the requirement that children with disabilities be provided special 
education—an individualized education which recognizes their unique needs—and 
Congress’s strong preference that children with disabilities be desegregated. In other 
words, Congress requires schools to treat children with disabilities differently than 
children without disabilities, underscoring their uniqueness, while on the other hand 
preferring that schools educate children with disabilities alongside non-disabled 
children, emphasizing their commonality with other children.”). 
 140. See Farley, supra note 79, at 838 (“Use of the word ‘appropriate’ 
recognizes that full inclusion with peers who are not disabled may not be possible for 
some students because the student’s behavior either disrupts the work of the other 
students or causes the teacher to spend too much time addressing those behaviors.”). 
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of appropriate education.141 In addition, some scholars have even 
proposed their own tests or solutions to mainstreaming and LRE 
problems.142  
A. Different Scholarly Opinions About Special Education 
On the spectrum of scholarly opinions and approaches about 
special education, some commentators have proposed an inclusion-
only system of education to maximize mainstreaming.143 On the other 
hand, other scholars have emphasized the importance of 
mainstreaming in nonacademic activities when inclusion in the regular 
classroom is not feasible.144 Scholars have also stressed that, in 
deciding placements, schools must have pedagogic reasoning for the 
placement and not focus solely on costs or arbitrary factors.145 
                                                   
 141. Compare Rebell & Hughes, supra note 85, at 525 (explaining the 
proposal for an inclusion-only system of special education), with Farley, supra note 
79, at 818 (discussing the importance of mainstreaming in any way possible), and 
Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 112-13 (noting the need for schools to justify 
placement decisions). 
 142. See, e.g., Julie Underwood O’Hara, The Fate of Educational 
Malpractice, 14 ED. LAW REP. 887, 895 (1984) (also discussing placement 
malpractice and the need for schools to relate placements of students to some 
education methodology); Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. 
REV. 83, 156 (2009) (explaining the need to fix overrepresentation of students in 
special education); Judith M. Wolf, Roncker v. Walter: Another Step Toward 
Mainstreaming for All Children, 21 ED. L. REP. 441, 446 (1985) (introducing a 
placement malpractice concept).  
 143. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 85, at 525 (explaining commentators’ 
proposals for an inclusion-only system of special education). 
 144. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 79, at 818 (“Furthermore, if students with 
disabilities cannot be included in a regular class for academic work, then they should 
participate in non-academic activities to the maximum extent appropriate. For 
example, a student should be allowed to join his or her regular education classmates 
for activities like meals and recess periods. In doing so, a student with a disability can 
maintain contact with non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate to the 
needs of that child.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Osborne, Jr., supra note 39, 
at 446 (“Students with more severe handicaps may receive the major portion of their 
instruction in a special education class, but may join their nonhandicapped peers for 
lunch, recess, and other nonacademic activities. Students who are profoundly 
handicapped, or whose handicapping condition would present a significant disruption 
to the regular education environment may not be mainstreamed at all.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 112-13 (“When a school district 
proposes a completely segregated program, it must justify that segregation by 
explaining why a child cannot have contact with non-handicapped peers.”); O’Hara, 
supra note 142, at 895 (discussing the need for schools to relate placements of students 
to some educational methodology); Rebell & Hughes, supra note 85, at 538 
(discussing teachers’ decisions to refer students to special education that may lack a 
legitimate, pedagogic basis).  
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1. Inclusion-Only Supporters Oppose Any Separate Classrooms 
At one end of the spectrum of scholarly opinions about 
mainstreaming, some inclusion supporters believe in entirely 
eliminating separate classes for special education, which could solve 
the issue of mainstreaming with same-age peers.146 However, many 
opponents of inclusion-only education find this approach to be too 
simplistic.147 The inclusion-only supporters may rely on the problem 
of teachers often referring students to special education with no sound 
pedagogic reasoning, arbitrarily segregating them from their same-
age, nondisabled peers.148 Further, inclusion-only proponents believe 
that strict inclusion practices may improve students’ attitudes, peer 
interactions, and socialization abilities.149 While this view may seem 
extreme to some parents and educators, an elimination of the 
continuum of services would supposedly maximize same-age peer 
mainstreaming without eliminating support in regular classrooms for 
students with disabilities.150 
2. Inclusion Should Consider Nonacademic Activities as Much 
as Possible 
At a different point on this spectrum of opinions, many scholars 
have reasoned that mainstreaming should occur in nonacademic 
activities as much as possible if mainstreaming cannot feasibly occur 
in the regular classroom.151 These activities could even simply be 
                                                   
 146. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 85, at 525 (“Some commentators have 
concluded the only way to assure that all children are educated in the least restrictive 
environment is to eliminate separate special education systems; they call for the ‘full 
inclusion’ of all students with disabilities in the mainstream with appropriate supports 
and services.”). 
 147. See id. (“Opponents of such ‘inclusion’ contend that its proponents offer 
a simplistic answer to complex problems of children at risk of academic failure.”). 
 148. See id. at 538 (describing inclusionists’ critiques of teachers’ reasoning 
for referring students to special education). 
 149. See id. at 541 (“In addition to promoting greater academic achievement, 
full inclusion proponents believe a fully integrated school achieves better socialization 
skills, attitudes, and positive peer relations.”). 
 150. See id. at 540-41 (explaining that eliminating a continuum of services can 
reduce labeling of students with disabilities but would not deprive them of supports 
altogether). Full inclusionists “would eliminate special education and maintain all 
students with disabilities in the mainstream classroom.” Id. at 540. 
 151. See Farley, supra note 79, at 818 (“Furthermore, if students with 
disabilities cannot be included in a regular class for academic work, then they should 
participate in nonacademic activities to the maximum extent appropriate. For 
example, a student should be allowed to join his or her regular education classmates 
for activities like meals and recess periods. In doing so, a student with a disability can 
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lunch and recess.152 Along with this view, one scholar prefers the 
Daniel R.R. LRE test for mainstreaming because that test first asks 
whether a student can be properly educated in a regular classroom with 
supplemental services.153 If education in the regular class is not 
possible, the test then asks whether the student is still mainstreamed 
as much as possible, which can include several nonacademic 
activities.154 This scholar argues that the Daniel R.R. test appropriately 
adheres to the purpose of IDEA and the intent of the LRE provision, 
making the regular classroom the default setting for students.155 
Despite the alleged difficulty of analyzing the first prong of the Daniel 
R.R. test, the second prong is more direct.156 Under the second prong, 
courts only need to examine whether students can be mainstreamed 
for music, art, gym, lunch, recess, and other similar activities, allowing 
students to have maximum interactions with their same-age, 
nondisabled peers.157 
                                                   
maintain contact with non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate to the 
needs of that child. . . . [I]f a student with a disability is segregated, he or she must 
still be included with regular peers for non-academic activities like lunch and recess 
to the maximum extent appropriate.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Osborne, 
Jr., supra note 39, at 446 (explaining that students with severe handicaps may still 
“join their nonhandicapped peers for lunch, recess, and other nonacademic 
activities”). On the other hand, even if students struggle to absorb concepts in the 
regular classroom, placement in that class may be proper if they can benefit from 
language models of their peers. See Farley, supra note 79, at 824. 
 152. See Osborne, supra note 39, at 446 (describing nonacademic classes and 
activities like meals and recess). 
 153. See Farley, supra note 79, at 834 (explaining first the Daniel R.R. test, 
then explaining why the test is superior to Roncker). 
 154. See id. at 834 (“The test consists of two questions: (1) Can the student be 
educated satisfactorily in the regular classroom when provided supplementary aids 
and services? (2) If the student must be placed in a more segregated setting, has the 
student been mainstreamed to the maximum extent possible?”). 
 155. See id. (“Furthermore, this framework adheres to the intent behind the 
LRE requirement by making inclusion the default setting so that a student is only 
removed if education with supplemental aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.”). 
 156. See id. at 842 (“This second prong should be relatively 
straightforward . . . .”). 
 157. See id. (“[A]sking courts to assess whether the student can be integrated 
for activities like recess, lunch, gym, or art and music classes. This model test in its 
entirety incorporates both current jurisprudence and [c]ongressional intent behind the 
1997 Amendments.”). 
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3. Schools Need to Provide a Detailed Explanation for 
Segregating Students 
Under IDEA, schools cannot completely segregate students with 
disabilities without providing an explanation for why a child cannot 
be mainstreamed with his or her peers.158 Schools can currently offer 
certain justifications for segregation, such as a lack of an educational 
benefit from mainstreaming or excessive costs of inclusion.159 
However, one scholar argues that the educational benefit argument 
should not matter because a true continuum would offer staggered 
levels of restriction.160 Thus, switching to the next lesser restrictive 
program on the continuum should not eliminate all educational 
benefits for an individual.161 If a school only provides special 
education in a building entirely for students with disabilities, the 
school might incur excessive costs by mainstreaming those students 
in the main building.162 Nevertheless, if courts permit cost to be a 
factor, scholars have noted that schools can effectively circumvent the 
continuum of placement requirements by arguing the costs of 
mainstreaming excessively burden the school.163 
Unlike the Daniel R.R. test, the Rachel H. test includes cost as a 
factor, even though many courts do not even consider costs unless the 
                                                   
 158. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 112-13 (“When a school district 
proposes a completely segregated program, it must justify that segregation by 
explaining why a child cannot have contact with non-handicapped peers.”). 
 159. See id. at 113 (“There is a presumptive preference for mainstream 
contacts for handicapped students, but a school district can sufficiently rebut this 
presumption by arguing either that the mainstream program would confer no 
educational benefit, or that mainstream contacts for this child would be cost 
prohibitive.”). 
 160. See id. (“The absence of educational benefit argument is a weak argument 
because, if the school district has a true continuum of programs in place, one step 
toward lesser restriction should not negate all educational benefit.”). 
 161. See id. (explaining that “one step toward lesser restriction should not 
negate all educational benefit”). 
 162. See, e.g., Melvin, supra note 2, at 625 (explaining that modifications are 
not necessary if those modifications would cause “undue financial and administrative 
burdens”). 
 163. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 113 (“[I]f the school district provides 
this segregated program in a building exclusively for handicapped children, it may not 
be able to offer any mainstream contacts without incurring potentially prohibitive 
cost, as one step toward lesser restriction might require a move to another school 
building. Because prohibitive cost is a permissible argument for the school district, 
the school district can indefinitely avoid creating a continuum of placements, 
following the letter of the law under Rowley, yet miss the spirit of the law – to afford 
handicapped students educational opportunity equal to that of their nonhandicapped 
peers.”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 631 (explaining that if a school fails to provide a 
continuum of services, it cannot use cost as a defense). 
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parties raise that issue.164 One special education scholar believes the 
Daniel R.R. test may properly solve the cost analysis issue because 
courts can be flexible about what factors to consider in the first prong 
of the analysis.165 The scholar believes that the Daniel R.R. test is more 
appropriate than the Rachel H. test for analyzing placements on a case-
by-case basis while still adhering to the congressional intent of the 
LRE provision of IDEA.166 She further argues that under the Rachel 
H. test, schools may inappropriately segregate students with 
disabilities and deprive them of interactions with same-age peers 
because of the costs of mainstreaming.167 
B. Scholarly Solutions to Improve Special Education 
Based on the common critiques of current mainstreaming 
practices, some scholars propose possible solutions to improve special 
education.168 Specifically, one scholar proposes increasing specialized 
accommodations for students with disabilities within the 
mainstream.169 Scholars have also proposed retroactive solutions, such 
as placement malpractice causes of action, when schools err in 
deciding students’ LRE placements.170  
1. Solutions to Problems with Special Education Include 
Expanding Services 
Without specifically proposing a new LRE test, one scholar does 
propose certain solutions to the overrepresentation of students 
                                                   
 164. See Farley, supra note 79, at 834-35 (explaining the Rachel H. test 
framework). 
 165. See id. at 835 (“In contrast, the two-part framework would allow courts 
to pick and choose relevant factors to consider under the first prong depending on the 
facts of each case. Therefore, the two-part framework reflects the structure and intent 
of the LRE provision while maintaining the flexibility necessary for case-by-case 
analysis.”). 
 166. See id. (explaining the preference for the Daniel R.R. test). 
 167. See id. (discussing that the Rachel H. test includes cost as a factor). 
 168. See Weber, supra note 142, at 152-59 (discussing ways to reform special 
education); infra Subsections II.B.1-II.B.2 (describing different scholars’ proposed 
solutions). 
 169. See Weber, supra note 142, at 156 (explaining that accommodations in 
the mainstream are less restrictive than separating students with disabilities from 
regular classrooms). 
 170. See, e.g., O’Hara, supra note 142, at 895 (explaining the potential for 
placement malpractice); Wolf, supra note 142, at 446 (describing placement 
malpractice causes of action). 
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requiring special education.171 He believes in expanding and adapting 
supplemental services in the regular classroom, which can happen 
specifically as part of special education, or for the classroom in 
general.172 He also notes that these adaptations and accommodations 
would combat the forced separation of students from their nondisabled 
peers.173 In addition, he argues that schools could increase after-school 
special education, which could even occur at students’ homes.174 
Courts have edged toward beliefs that specialized, accommodating 
education programs within the mainstream are less restrictive 
placements for students, even if students would have fewer and 
therefore less restrictive services in a self-contained classroom.175 
2. Scholars Propose Placement Malpractice 
After courts make the initial finding that an LRE placement is 
wrong, a more specific solution to remedy wrongful placement could 
be for courts to accept placement malpractice causes of actions.176 
Higher courts have not upheld any placement malpractice damages 
yet, but the concept has enough potential to be taken seriously.177 In 
dissenting opinions, judges have recognized the potential benefits of 
                                                   
 171. See Weber, supra note 142, at 156 (“[T]he forced separation of children 
into non-mainstream, low expectation programs, needs to be fixed.”). 
 172. See id. (“There are a number of remedies to be undertaken. One is to 
expand in-class assistance through curricular adaptations and accommodations, 
whether these are designated special education or something else.”). 
 173. See id. (“Courts have edged towards the recognition that specialized 
programs directed at enabling children to succeed in the mainstream are a less 
restrictive educational option than placing a child in a self-contained special education 
class in the public school . . . .”). 
 174. See id. (“Another [remedy] is to increase the availability of after-school 
special education services delivered either at home or elsewhere.”). 
 175. See id. (“Courts have edged towards the recognition that specialized 
programs directed at enabling children to succeed in the mainstream are a less 
restrictive educational option than placing a child in a self-contained special education 
class in the public school, and so may be required irrespective of the fact that children 
might still benefit educationally from fewer services in a self-contained setting.”). 
 176. See Wolf, supra note 142, at 446 (“[L]egal forecasters predict a new form 
of professional accountability—placement malpractice. [One scholar] identifies 
placement malpractice as a legal case[,] which arises from the classification of, or 
services provided, to handicapped children. [She] notes that although damage awards 
to plaintiffs in educational malpractice suits have not been upheld by higher courts, 
placement malpractice is more like medical malpractice and is more likely to be taken 
seriously by the courts.”). 
 177. See id. (discussing placement malpractice).  
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applying placement malpractice damages.178 Opponents of this 
concept argue that recognizing a new cause of action would flood the 
courts.179 However, proponents of placement malpractice suits argue 
that increased litigation is irrelevant due to the need to protect 
students’ interests.180 Additionally, the courts would not be 
recognizing a new cause of action; rather, they would simply be 
eliminating the current defense that the professional is employed by 
an educational institution.181  
Courts have been concerned with the appropriateness of 
monetary damages in cases where schools failed to provide proper 
education, finding the better remedy to be putting the plaintiff in the 
position he or she would have been in without the school’s 
negligence.182 Schools have remediated their negligence by paying a 
student’s tuition for a private school or increasing their services for 
the student.183 Despite the alleged difficulty of deciding the value of 
an education, courts have decided values of certain body parts or 
functions in medical malpractice cases.184 Thus, according to 
proponents of placement malpractice, courts could easily determine 
whether a professional’s improper placement of a student caused an 
injury just as courts determine whether a medical practitioner’s failure 
                                                   
 178. See O’Hara, supra note 142, at 895 (“Judging from the dissenting 
opinions, a great possibility exists that placement malpractice rather than instructional 
malpractice will be recognized by the courts.”). 
 179. See id. at 893 (“This argument was even made in the discussion of the 
recognition of students’ due process rights. Justice Powell stated in the dissent to Goss 
v. Lopez: One can only speculate as to the extent to which public education will be 
disrupted by giving every school-child the power to contest in court any decision 
made by his teacher which arguably infringes the state-conferred right to education.”). 
 180. See id. (“It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it 
even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation,’ and it is a pitiful confession of 
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such grounds.” 
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971))). 
 181. See id. (“[T]he amount of litigation is irrelevant if the plaintiff has an 
interest that should be protected. Additionally, in placement malpractice situations 
there is really no recognition of a new cause of action. Recognition would merely 
disallow professionals use of their employment by an educational institution as a 
defense.”). 
 182. See id. at 894 (“Additionally, courts have expressed concern in these 
cases that monetary damages would be an inappropriate remedy for the lack of an 
education. The more appropriate remedy would be in a more direct manner, to bring 
the plaintiff to the state he would have been in had the negligence not occurred.”). 
 183. See id. (“This remediation might be a payment for tuition at private 
institutions or provision of other services to the plaintiff.”). 
 184. See id. (“Certainly, quantification of the value of an education is 
extremely difficult. It is equally difficult to quantify the value of sight or use of a body 
part and yet the courts have accepted the latter tasks.”). 
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to properly diagnose and treat a person caused injury.185 While the 
future of placement malpractice is unclear, laws can adapt to meet 
society’s needs.186 
One scholar’s proposed LRE test requires schools to prove that 
their segregated or self-contained placements are related to an 
“educational methodology.”187 In order to decide whether schools have 
met this burden, courts can look to factors such as: (1) the cost-
efficiency of these placements;188 (2) the number of students with 
similar needs;189 and (3) the lack of educational benefit for students in 
the regular class because of unique needs that can only be served in a 
segregated placement.190 Under this test, each child would need an 
individual assessment, and schools could only justify a child’s 
placement with some educational methodological reasoning or 
arguments about excessive costs.191 Despite scholars’ proposed 
                                                   
 185. See id. (“The causation argument seems inappropriate in the context of 
placement malpractice. These facts are closely analogous, if not identical, to medical 
malpractice situations in which failure to properly diagnose and treat a person is found 
to cause injury. Thus, in placement malpractice, determining that a practitioner’s 
failure to properly diagnose and treat a student caused injury to the student should not 
be any more difficult.”). 
 186. See id. at 895 (“[T]ort law is supposed to evolve to meet the changing 
needs of society.”). 
 187. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 129 (“[T]he Court should require that 
school districts support their decisions to offer only segregated or centralized 
programs as reasonable choices of educational methodology.”). 
 188. See id. (explaining that schools can prove they have met the “educational 
methodology” burden by showing they “can economize costs by centralizing its 
staff”). 
 189. See id. (explaining that a school can next show that “the centralized 
program is needed because of a sufficient number of students with similar needs”). 
 190. See id. (explaining that the school can finally show that “the students 
would not receive educational benefit elsewhere because their needs are unique, or . . . 
these unique needs can best be met in a segregated setting”). 
 191. See id. (clarifying that schools cannot “rely on physical access alone as a 
choice of educational methodology”). Abrahamson offers another test when the only 
issue with placements is mainstreaming, not segregation. See id. (“First, it must be 
determined whether both of the proposed programs meet the Rowley test for 
‘appropriateness.’ If so, a factor test should then be applied to determine which level 
of restriction is appropriate for this individual child. Courts should consider the 
following factors: the decisions of the state administrative agencies; the congressional 
preference for mainstreaming; cost when argued; and the choice of the parents or the 
student himself. It is not suggested that any of these factors be given a predetermined 
or precise weight, for the ‘individualized’ nature of the Act requires that each case be 
analyzed based on its individual merits.”). Abrahamson recommends her 
mainstreaming test be used as a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, establishing 
the weight of each factor on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 130. 
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improvements for LRE placements, many barriers still prevent proper 
implementation of IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement.192  
III. PROBLEMS THAT ACCOMPANY MAINSTREAMING 
Regardless of the scholarly opinions about mainstreaming, 
certain problems do interfere with the congressional goal of maximum 
mainstreaming with nondisabled peers.193 For example, teachers may 
have implicit biases about students with disabilities.194 Furthermore, 
parents may have qualms about teachers’ qualifications to handle both 
special education students and regular education students.195 
Additionally, Congress does not expect schools to modify their 
curriculum “beyond recognition” to mainstream students with 
disabilities.196 Finally, schools could incur excessive financial burdens 
in attempting to mainstream students with same-age, nondisabled 
peers as much as possible.197 
A. Parent–Teacher Conflicts About Mainstreaming and Special 
Education 
In some districts, teachers’ salaries are tied to student 
performance on standardized tests.198 Those teachers may believe 
nondisabled students’ test performances will be lower because of the 
teachers’ need to spend more time accommodating students with 
disabilities.199 Thus, a teacher might be more likely to support a more 
                                                   
 192. See infra Part III (detailing current problems and negative opinions about 
mainstreaming). 
 193. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 125 (discussing teachers’ potential 
biases in mainstreaming); id. at 126 (explaining the parental fear of teachers’ lack of 
qualifications and the fear of returning their child to a classroom where the child 
initially failed); see also Melvin, supra note 2, at 642, 649-50 (explaining the problem 
with modifying the regular classroom); id. at 654 (explaining the financial burdens of 
special education). 
 194. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 125 (explaining one issue with 
mainstreaming is teachers’ biases). 
 195. See id. at 126 (discussing parents’ concerns about teachers’ qualifications 
for educating students with disabilities and explaining that parents may not want their 
children to return to a classroom where they once failed).  
 196. Melvin, supra note 2, at 642, 649-50 (explaining Congress’s expectations 
for classroom modifications). 
 197. See id. at 654 (explaining the excessive costs of special education). 
 198. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 125 (“[O]ften educators’ salary 
increases are tied to their students’ performance on standardized tests.”). 
 199. See id. (“Educators may oppose the application of the least restrictive 
environment because they fear that the presence of handicapped children in their 
mainstream classrooms will lower the standard of education for all students.”).  
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restrictive placement for a student with disabilities.200 Even if a teacher 
does support the regular classroom for a student’s LRE, that teacher 
may not have the qualifications to handle both diverse student 
populations and special education in the regular classroom.201 If the 
teacher is qualified, parents still might fear sending their child back to 
the regular classroom if the child was initially unsuccessful there 
before being evaluated for an IEP.202 Those parents might feel more 
comfortable leaving their child in a family-like, homogenous, self-
contained environment.203 Therefore, many issues could arise with 
mainstreaming in the regular classroom.204 However, the problems 
with a teacher’s desire to improve test scores or a teacher’s lack of 
qualifications is that they seemingly only apply to academic subject 
areas.205 Accordingly, at a minimum, students could be mainstreamed 
in nonacademic courses with few issues from teachers.206 
                                                   
 200. See id. (explaining teachers’ implicit biases). 
 201. See id. at 126 (“Some educators and parents also may believe that a 
classroom teacher is not qualified to be both classroom teacher and ‘special education’ 
teacher. Another systemic problem may be that the least restrictive environment focus 
is on the individual child, which conflicts with the public education goal of mass 
education of large numbers of children. Parents may oppose their child’s return to the 
regular classroom with skepticism because that was probably the place where their 
child failed initially. Additionally, it is understandable that parents may prefer to keep 
their children in a safe, homogeneous program in which their children have enjoyed 
relative success. Some special education programs foster student-teacher 
relationships[,] which are almost family-like. Many special education students are 
physically, educationally and emotionally needy, and justifiably rely on special 
educators who are extremely dedicated people. It is difficult for both parents and 
students when students must leave this type of nurturing environment. Finally, ‘in 
implementing least restrictive environment, the courts have not focused on the 
creation of appropriate educational placements, only on the selection of one of two 
available choices.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 202. See id. (“Another systemic problem may be that the least restrictive 
environment focus is on the individual child, which conflicts with the public education 
goal of mass education of large numbers of children. Parents may oppose their child’s 
return to the regular classroom with skepticism because that was probably the place 
where their child failed initially.”). 
 203. See id. (discussing parents’ reluctance to remove their children from a 
nurturing classroom).  
 204. See id. (describing the potential issues with mainstreaming in the regular 
classroom). Opponents of the “Regular Education Initiative” find that total inclusion 
fails to adhere to the requirement for a “continuum of alternative placements based on 
students’ individualized needs.” Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 127. 
 205. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 126-27 (explaining the general issues 
with mainstreaming such as teachers’ qualifications and biases). 
 206. See Farley, supra note 79, at 818 (“Furthermore, if students with 
disabilities cannot be included in a regular class for academic work, then they should 
participate in non-academic activities to the maximum extent appropriate.”). 
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B. Problems with Modification of the Regular Classroom 
Another problem with the mainstreaming requirement is that 
federal courts are divided as to whether IDEA’s provision compels 
schools to modify their existing curriculum and methodology to 
accommodate special education in regular classrooms.207 The 
Department of Justice promulgated regulations directly stating that 
public entities do not need to make modifications that would 
fundamentally alter the entity or excessively burden the entity’s 
finances.208 Further, the Daniel R.R. court found that IDEA does not 
mandate schools to modify their regular education curriculum 
“beyond recognition” in order to include students with disabilities.209 
Rather, that court decided schools must inquire whether or not a 
student understands “essential elements” of the existing curriculum in 
the regular class.210 In contrast, the Oberti court found that the unique 
learning style of students with special needs does not alone justify 
                                                   
 207. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 642 (explaining the division in courts about 
whether “IDEA requires schools to make modifications to the regular education 
curriculum and instructional methodology to accommodate the inclusion of children 
with disabilities. One view, illustrated by Daniel R.R., is that the mainstreaming 
mandate does not require provision of special education in the regular classroom”). 
Some courts inadvertently deny students with disabilities a proper education by only 
considering unmodified regular classrooms: 
[T]he issue that fundamentally divides the federal courts of appeals is 
whether the mainstreaming mandate requires schools to modify the regular 
education curriculum, in effect providing special education in the regular 
classroom. This issue takes on added significance in view of the fact that 
courts addressing the mainstreaming issue have routinely considered the 
educational benefits of inclusion in terms of the benefits of the unmodified 
regular education program. Since an unmodified regular education 
program, even with supplementary aids and services, is not likely to confer 
an appreciable educational benefit on disabled children with moderate to 
severe learning or intellectual impairments, these children are effectively 
denied access to the regular classroom on the grounds that a segregated 
placement is educationally superior. 
Id. at 649-50. 
 208. See id. at 625 (“Regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice 
state that a public entity does not have to modify its programs or activities if the result 
would be a ‘fundamental alteration in the nature of . . . the program, or activity or 
[impose] undue financial and administrative burdens.’” (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 
35.150(a)(3) (1993))). 
 209. Id. at 650 (“However, in Daniel R.R., the court took the position that the 
Act does not require the school to modify the regular education program beyond 
recognition; nor is the school required to provide to provide special education in the 
regular classroom.”). 
 210. Id. (“Rather, the school’s inquiry should focus on the student’s ability to 
grasp the essential elements of the regular education curriculum.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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exclusion from the regular class, leading at least one scholar to believe 
that some reasonable modifications to the classroom are necessary.211 
That scholar argues these modifications provide “meaningful access” 
to education for students with disabilities and allow for mainstreaming 
with same-age, nondisabled peers.212  
C. Financial Burdens of Mainstreaming 
Another difficulty with mainstreaming is that it may impose a 
financial burden on schools.213 IDEA only mandates that schools make 
inclusion efforts that are practicable, so excessive financial burdens 
may render education in the regular classroom inappropriate.214 
However, the incremental cost of mainstreaming does not entitle 
schools to place students in a more affordable, segregated setting.215 
Otherwise, children’s segregated placements may be based on 
institutional abilities as opposed to individual needs, which contradicts 
the LRE provision of IDEA.216 Furthermore, in cases involving 
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has held that citizens must be 
afforded those rights even if greater expenses are involved.217 
Despite the Supreme Court’s opinion that citizens are entitled to 
constitutional rights no matter the cost,218 rapidly increasing special 
                                                   
 211. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that unique learning styles alone do not justify exclusion); Melvin, supra 
note 2, at 650 (describing the Oberti case and improper exclusion from regular 
classrooms). 
 212. Melvin, supra note 2, at 652 (“Thus, schools should be expected to make 
reasonable modifications to the regular education program where necessary to give 
disabled children meaningful access, unless of course the modification is shown to 
unduly burden other disabled or non-disabled students.”). 
 213. See id. at 654 (“The limit on the school’s obligation to provide support 
services necessary to mainstream a disabled child is generally expressed as a financial 
limit. Such a limit is consistent with the terms of the IDEA.”). 
 214. See id. at 654-55 (“Furthermore, the Act expressly limits the obligation 
of local school districts to provide services in support of inclusion to that which is 
‘practicable.’ Thus, the Act contemplates a financial limit on the school’s obligation 
to accommodate the education of disabled children in the regular classroom.”). 
 215. See id. at 655 (“However, this [financial limit] does not mean that a 
school district may deny disabled children a mainstream placement because it is 
incrementally more expensive than a segregated one.”). 
 216. See id. (“Therefore, if a mere incremental increase in cost were a 
permissible basis for denying inclusion to disabled children, many disabled children 
could be legally excluded; a result hardly contemplated by the mainstreaming 
mandate.”). 
 217. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) (citing 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969)) (explaining that the costs of special education 
are not a sufficient basis for exclusion). 
 218. See id. (weighing costs versus constitutional rights). 
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education costs do pose difficulties for schools.219 Because of these 
costs, school districts struggle to fund proper implementation of 
special education reform.220 Some policymakers blame schools’ 
overrepresentation of special education students for the cost 
increases.221 However, one study found that the increased costs of 
special education were beyond the control of school district policies 
and practices.222 The study noted that advances in medical 
technology,223 deinstitutionalization of children with disabilities,224 and 
social and economic factors were to blame for higher costs of special 
education.225 Despite school districts’ alleged innocence regarding 
costs,226 these school districts still must find appropriate ways to 
guarantee all children a proper, free education under IDEA.227 
IV. ADVOCATING FOR A NEW TEST FROM THE SUPREME COURT 
BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT MAINSTREAMING POLICIES  
Schools must provide a continuum of services for students’ 
LREs,228 but self-contained classrooms in separate buildings from 
same-age peers are not the equivalent of a self-contained classroom in 
the school building.229 Only students so severely handicapped that they 
                                                   
 219. See Sheldon H. Berman & David K. Urion, The Misdiagnosis of Special 
Education Costs, AASA, http://www.aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx? 
id=9248 [https://perma.cc/YUV9-FHPL] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) (discussing 
increases in special education costs). 
 220. See id. (explaining that costs are “compromising the ability of districts to 
effectively fund the implementation of these [special education] reforms”). 
 221. See id. (discussing how policymakers “claim schools are funneling too 
many children into special education to ease the burden on the classroom teacher of 
addressing behavioral and learning problems”). 
 222. See id. (citing medical advances, deinstitutionalization, and economic 
and social factors as the reasons for increased special education costs). 
 223. See id. (“Medical technology has advanced to such a degree that children 
who would not have otherwise survived due to prematurity or disability now live well 
beyond their school years.”). 
 224. See id. (detailing the shift away from institutionalization of public 
schooling). 
 225. See id. (explaining the sharp increase in poverty and discussing “[t]he 
correlation between poverty and special needs”). 
 226. See id. (discussing the reasons for cost increases in special education). 
 227. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“A free appropriate public 
education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the 
ages of 3 and 21 . . . .”). 
 228. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE MANUAL, 
supra note 10, § 11:87 (detailing the continuum of services for students with 
disabilities). 
 229. See id. (describing the continuum); see also Michelle Moor, 
Understanding LRE: What Is the Least Restrictive Environment?, THE L. OFF. OF 
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cannot satisfactorily receive education in the regular building should 
be placed in entirely separate buildings.230 If schools place third 
through fifth grade students in a self-contained classroom in a building 
of only kindergarten through second grade students, the school must 
have deliberate reasons for excluding those students from the main 
building and their nondisabled, same-age peers.231 If the school’s 
decision is arbitrary or due to overcrowding, the school should be 
liable to the student for placement malpractice.232  
In the Smith Elementary School example, students in the 
segregated building do not have opportunities to engage with same-
age, nondisabled peers.233 Conversely, in Jason O. v. Manhattan 
School District, the court found a segregated placement to be 
acceptable because the student had plenty of opportunities to interact 
with his nondisabled peers.234 While the case was vacated, the district 
court mentioned that a segregated building is acceptable when 
students have opportunities to interact with nondisabled peers in art, 
gym, music, recess, and lunch.235 Smith Elementary School and many 
other schools with limited resources do not provide such 
mainstreaming opportunities for students educated in segregated 
buildings.236 Despite the financial or logistical burden schools may 
bear when mainstreaming, the Constitution and general public policy 
tend to show that students with disabilities have legitimate, protected 
                                                   
MICHELLE MOOR (Aug. 26, 2016), http://michellemoor.com/understanding-lre-least-
restrictive-environment/ [https://perma.cc/5KHY-YSY6] (explaining the levels of 
placements). 
 230. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (limiting the situations where students with 
disabilities can be removed from the regular classroom). 
 231. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 112-13 (explaining that a school must 
justify its segregated special education programs). 
 232. See O’Hara, supra note 142, at 895; Wolf, supra note 142, at 446 
(explaining placement malpractice). 
 233. See Interview with Heather Hall, supra note 3 (providing the basis for the 
Smith Elementary School example). 
 234. See Jason O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744, 772 
(N.D. Ill. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. Ostby v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 
851 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding in district court that the school did not violate 
IDEA because the student was mainstreamed for lunch and recess as much as 
possible). 
 235. See id. at 772 (“Although structured, the SELF program does not wall-
off Jacob entirely from his nondisabled peers. Children in the program can interact 
with their nondisabled peers in multiple arenas, including in: (1) special area subjects 
(e.g., art, music and gym); (2) lunch and recess; and (3) academic classes, based upon 
Jacob’s emotional ability to handle those classes.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Opotow, supra note 12, at 145 (“Both internationally and 
domestically, overcrowding results from increases in student enrollment that are 
unmatched by an expansion of educational resources.”). 
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interests in education.237 Even with existing constitutional and public 
policy arguments for mainstreaming,238 the Supreme Court should 
adopt a new, more individualized test for LREs. 
A. Public Policy and Constitutional Bases for Mainstreaming 
Segregation of children with disabilities violates due process and 
students’ liberties when students are deprived of any meaningful 
opportunity to mainstream with nondisabled, same-age peers.239 
IDEA’s due process requirement entails individualized analyses of 
each student regardless of blanket policies or potential costs.240 A 
major problem with mainstreaming is that schools use the excessive 
cost of mainstreaming to justify their restrictive, segregated 
placements of students.241 This current justification deprives students 
of their due process rights.242 Furthermore, schools do not focus 
enough on the benefits that nondisabled students confer on students 
with disabilities and vice versa.243 
                                                   
 237. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 605-06 (“Drawing on the landmark Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, parents and advocates went to court 
in unprecedented numbers in the early 1970s, claiming that an equal educational 
opportunity for disabled children was guaranteed by the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); O’Hara, supra note 142, at 893 
(“[T]he amount of litigation is irrelevant if the plaintiff has an interest that should be 
protected.”). 
 238. See, e.g., Melvin, supra note 2, at 605-06 (providing an example of some 
of the constitutional arguments about education). 
 239. See id. at 648 (explaining that separation of students with disabilities can 
deprive those students of their liberty); see also id. at 605-06 (discussing Brown v. 
Board of Education’s impact on equal education opportunities for children with 
disabilities based on constitutional guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection).  
 240. See Romberg, supra note 131, at 446 (explaining the two layers of due 
process under IDEA—the due process hearing and due process in the formation of 
IEPs). 
 241. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 113 (“There is a presumptive 
preference for mainstream contacts for handicapped students, but a school district can 
sufficiently rebut this presumption by arguing either that the mainstream program 
would confer no educational benefit, or that mainstream contacts for this child would 
be cost prohibitive.”). 
 242. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 648 (“Due process protections were enacted 
in part to assure that every child with a disability is ‘in fact’ afforded an education in 
the ‘least restrictive environment.’ Further, segregating students on the basis of a 
disability involves labeling children, a practice which itself poses a threat to individual 
liberty.”). 
 243. See id. at 617 (“Notably, members of Congress believed that educating 
disabled children with non-disabled children would have as much effect on children 
without disabilities as it would on children with disabilities. Senator Stafford, a 
sponsor of the Act, wrote of the disabled child’s invisibility – kept out of sight, and 
when seen by others, seen not as an individual, but as a manifestation of a disabling 
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1. Mainstreaming Can Be Cost Effective 
While costs of educating students with disabilities might 
increase with more emphasis on mainstreaming, Congress enacted 
IDEA with the belief that spending money on special education was 
more cost effective than taking responsibility for those students in 
institutions or as welfare dependents.244 The financial burdens imposed 
on schools are not entirely discounted, but society’s financial interests 
are negatively impacted when children with disabilities are excluded 
from appropriate education.245 For schools with segregated buildings, 
these possible financial implications include either creating more 
classrooms in the main building or transporting students to the main 
building for nonacademic activities.246 Schools have no duty to 
fundamentally modify their programs, but the students’ interests and 
congressional intent for mainstreaming should typically trump the 
potential costs for the schools.247 In fact, the presumption should 
always be that a student’s individualized interests in mainstreaming 
with same-age peers trump the school’s interest in saving money.248 
                                                   
condition. Once disabled children are mainstreamed, it was hoped, other children 
would come to see the disabled children as having a disability, not as a disability. 
Children would grow up realizing that their peers with disabilities are neither 
threatening nor evil.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 244. See id. at 618 (“The integration of individuals with disabilities into the 
mainstream of society was not only a constitutional concern to Congress but an 
economic concern as well. Congress viewed the prevalence of dependency and 
unproductivity among the adult disabled population as a problem that begins in the 
schools. Artificial barriers to the full participation of individuals with disabilities not 
only perpetuate the stigma and indignity of institutionalization and dependency, but 
impose substantial financial burdens on families and ultimately society as a whole. 
Consequently, Congress believed that money spent on educating children with 
disabilities to be self-sufficient adult members of society would be more humane, and 
less expensive to society than maintaining such persons as welfare dependents or in 
institutions.”). 
 245. See id. (explaining that money spent on education benefits society by 
decreasing future dependency on the state). 
 246. See, e.g., Jason O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744, 
772 (N.D. Ill. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. Ostby v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 
114, 851 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the school would transport students 
with a van to the main building in cases of inclement weather). 
 247. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 642, 649-50 (explaining the costs and 
problems with modification in the regular classroom for students with disabilities). 
 248. See, e.g., id. at 649-50 (“[T]he issue that fundamentally divides the 
federal courts of appeals is whether the mainstreaming mandate requires schools to 
modify the regular education curriculum, in effect providing special education in the 
regular classroom. This issue takes on added significance in view of the fact that 
courts addressing the mainstreaming issue have routinely considered the educational 
benefits of inclusion in terms of the benefits of the unmodified regular education 
program. Since an unmodified regular education program, even with supplementary 
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In specific cases, like at Smith Elementary School, where 
students with disabilities are in entirely separate buildings, possible 
financial implications do exist to mainstream those students.249 For 
example, schools might have to pay for a van or bus to transport those 
students to the main building for gym, recess, art, and other 
nonacademic activities if the building is too far for students to walk or 
in cases of inclement weather.250 If the school makes a good-faith 
effort to find space in the main building for a self-contained classroom 
and fails, the potential cost of transporting segregated students to the 
main building is insignificant in light of the congressional intent for 
all students to receive a free and appropriate public education.251 
Schools are not insulated from providing special education even if 
they are not at fault.252 However, the state and federal governments 
need to provide adequate funding to help struggling schools follow 
IDEA.253 
                                                   
aids and services, is not likely to confer an appreciable educational benefit on disabled 
children with moderate to severe learning or intellectual impairments, these children 
are effectively denied access to the regular classroom on the grounds that a segregated 
placement is educationally superior.”). 
 249. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 113 (explaining that schools can rebut 
the “presumptive preference” for mainstreaming by arguing that mainstreaming 
“would be cost prohibitive”). But see Melvin, supra note 2, at 655 (explaining that if 
incremental increases in costs were bases for denying inclusion, “many disabled 
children could be legally excluded; a result hardly contemplated by the mainstreaming 
mandate”). 
 250. See Jason O., 173 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (“[T]he SELF program instructor . 
. . testified that when the weather is bad, instead of the children walking to the general 
education classroom building, the School District, as it had done in the past, would 
call a van to transport the children the one-tenth of a mile distance between the two 
buildings.”). 
 251. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012) (describing the requirement for 
schools to provide a free and appropriate public education). While the increased costs 
of special education could affect schools’ abilities to reform their mainstreaming 
practices, see generally Background of Special Education, supra note 55, costs are 
irrelevant in comparison to the need to protect students with disabilities. See, e.g., 
O’Hara, supra note 142, at 893 (“[T]he amount of litigation is irrelevant if the plaintiff 
has an interest that should be protected.”). For detailed cost analyses, see generally 
COLORADO COSTING OUT STUDY, supra note 55; MICHIGAN EDUCATION, supra note 
55; PENNSYLVANIA’S PUBLIC EDUCATION GOALS, supra note 55. 
 252. See § 1412(a)(1)(A) (enacting FAPE). 
 253. See Background of Special Education, supra note 55 (explaining that the 
federal government only provided “local school districts with just under 20 percent of 
its commitment” to special education funding in 2004). 
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2. Positive Effects on Nondisabled Students and Students with 
Disabilities Are Relevant 
Even with the potential financial burdens of maximizing the 
mainstreaming of segregated students with disabilities, the positive 
effects of mainstreaming on nondisabled students and students with 
disabilities cannot be overlooked.254 Nondisabled students confer 
social and developmental benefits on peers with disabilities, and 
schools must consider these benefits when limited or no opportunities 
for academic inclusion exist.255 Correspondingly, students with 
disabilities can help their same-age peers develop a deeper 
understanding of disabilities.256 All three main LRE tests consider the 
benefits of mainstreaming on the students with disabilities, but none 
explicitly address the benefits of mainstreaming on nondisabled 
students.257 
Unfortunately, students with disabilities might significantly 
disrupt students in general education settings, even during gym, 
recess, and other nonacademic courses.258 However, only disabilities 
that are so severe that education in the regular classroom is impossible 
mandate a more restrictive placement.259 If a student is severely 
disrupting his peers in even nonacademic activities like lunch, recess, 
                                                   
 254. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 617 (explaining how Congress felt 
mainstreaming would benefit students with disabilities and nondisabled students).   
 255. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Patrick M., 9 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825-26 (N.D. 
Ohio 1998) (“The Court also finds that the District’s practice of ‘mainstreaming’ 
students with learning or behavioral disabilities is an appropriate, if not essential, 
element to fostering academic and social development.”); see also Daniel R.R. v. State 
Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1989) (“For example, the language 
and behavior models available from nonhandicapped children may be essential or 
helpful to the handicapped child’s development. In other words, although a 
handicapped child may not be able to absorb all of the regular education curriculum, 
he may benefit from nonacademic experiences in the regular education 
environment.”). 
 256. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 617 (discussing Congress’s intent for 
mainstreaming to confer benefits on both nondisabled students and students with 
disabilities). 
 257. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text; supra notes 62-65 and 
accompanying text; supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
 258. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049 (noting the effects of disruptive 
behavior in the regular education environment). 
 259. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (“To the maximum extent 
appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private 
institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, 
and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities 
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of 
the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”). 
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art, music, or gym, separation might be necessary.260 However, if an 
older student does not meet this disruption threshold with kindergarten 
students in nonacademic activities, he or she would also be unlikely to 
disrupt his same-age peers; thus, mainstreaming with those of the 
same-age would be entirely plausible and appropriate.261 
B. The Future of Special Education Law 
If the Supreme Court does not issue LRE guidelines, circuit 
courts should, at the very least, adopt a placement malpractice cause 
of action.262 This cause of action would not entirely solve the current 
problems with special education, but it would provide some 
retroactive solutions for parents of students with disabilities.263 
However, an entirely new test from the Supreme Court or Congress 
could proactively improve the lives of students with disabilities and 
provide clear guidance for schools’ decisions.264 
1. Placement Malpractice Can Benefit Wronged Children  
When a court has determined that a school did improperly place 
a student with disabilities, the court should accept causes of action for 
placement malpractice.265 While the values of an education and peer 
interactions are hard to quantify, courts have managed to quantify the 
value of body parts in medical malpractice cases.266 The issuance of 
damages would benefit wronged children and allow families to 
support their children’s disabilities.267 Even if the schools employ 
additional services or pay for the student to attend a private school, a 
child might still need tutoring services at home to put the child in the 
                                                   
 260. See id. (describing the removal threshold). 
 261. See id.  
 262. See Wolf, supra note 142, at 446 (explaining the possibility of placement 
malpractice causes of action). 
 263. See O’Hara, supra note 142, at 893 (discussing the need to protect the 
interests of plaintiffs through placement malpractice suits). 
 264. See generally id.  
 265. See Wolf, supra note 142, at 446. 
 266. See O’Hara, supra note 142, at 894. 
 267. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 453 A.2d 814, 823 (Md. 1982) (Eldridge, 
J., dissenting) (“Moreover, it is not clear that money damages would be 
‘inappropriate’ in the instant case. Taking the petitioners’ allegations as true, Doe is 
now 23 years old and has completed his education. He has progressed to second grade 
reading and spelling levels and a third grade arithmetic level. He still has not learned 
to compensate for his dyslexia, and he has severe emotional problems. Doe is in need 
of psychological treatment and adequate special education, neither of which is being 
given by the school system and both of which cost money.”). 
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position where he or she would have been had the school’s negligence 
never happened.268 Additionally, placement malpractice may cause 
schools and teachers to be more meticulous with their decisions under 
IDEA.269 However, despite the potential benefits of placement 
malpractice, schools may suffer excessive financial losses from a 
malpractice suit and thus continue to justify their lack of a proper 
continuum of services.270 If placement malpractice is impracticable, 
schools can still improve their current mainstreaming practices with a 
new LRE test from the Supreme Court.271 
2. A New Test with Presumptions for States to Overcome Will 
Better Serve Students 
A new, clearer test for determining LREs may mitigate the need 
for a malpractice cause of action.272 Due process under IDEA requires 
schools to assess students’ individual needs; a new test must reflect 
that principle.273 Further, schools should truly adhere to the continuum 
of services and only place students in more restrictive placements if 
the school can rebut certain presumptions about each placement.274  
a. Initial Presumption of Regular Classroom Education 
The presumption for each student should be placement in the 
regular classroom with same-age peers, not necessarily peers of the 
same academic level.275 Schools can add supplementary services based 
                                                   
 268. See O’Hara, supra note 142, at 894 (explaining the remedies for students 
could be “payment for tuition at private institutions or provision of other services to 
the plaintiff”).  
 269. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 125 (explaining teachers’ 
general biases in placement decisions). See generally O’Hara, supra note 142 
(discussing overall pros and cons of placement malpractice).  
 270. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 113 (“There is a presumptive 
preference for mainstream contacts for handicapped students, but a school district can 
sufficiently rebut this presumption by arguing either that the mainstream program 
would confer no educational benefit, or that mainstream contacts for this child would 
be cost prohibitive.”). 
 271. See infra Subsection IV.B.2 (proposing a new LRE test). 
 272. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 273. See Romberg, supra note 131, at 446 (describing due process 
requirements of education). 
 274. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE MANUAL, 
supra note 10, § 11:87 (explaining the continuum of services). 
 275. See, e.g., Tucker v. Calloway Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (describing one child’s needs for “integration with peers of his own age”); 
Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991) (providing 
evidence that same-age peer interactions are valuable in partial mainstreaming); Sch. 
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on students’ individual needs.276 Schools can rebut the presumption of 
placement in the regular classroom with clear and convincing 
evidence that a student is not receiving any academic or social benefit 
from a full education in the regular classroom.277 While no clear and 
convincing burden of proof exists in special education law, this 
standard is applied in other child welfare situations.278 For example, 
the Supreme Court has held that states can only terminate parental 
rights using at least clear and convincing evidence.279 Michigan will 
only remove a child from an established custodial environment if clear 
and convincing evidence proves removal is in the child’s best 
interest.280 Similarly, schools should not remove students from their 
established educational environment—regular classrooms—without 
clear and convincing evidence that the students receive no benefit in 
the regular classroom.281 
                                                   
Dist. v. Grover, 755 F. Supp. 243, 247 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (discussing how “it was 
essential for [a student’s] social development that she interact with age-appropriate 
non-handicapped peers”). 
 276. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (explaining that removal of a child 
from a regular classroom is only acceptable if “education in regular classes with the 
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily”); e.g., 
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing 
the first step of the Daniel R.R. test, “whether education in the regular classroom, with 
the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given 
child”); supra note 172 and accompanying text (describing the remediating 
supplemental services for regular classrooms). 
 277. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (removal “from the regular educational environment 
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that 
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot 
be achieved satisfactorily”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 617-18 (describing academic 
and social benefits of mainstreaming); e.g., M.A. ex rel. G.A. v. Voorhees Twp. Bd. 
of Educ., 202 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 65 F. App’x 404 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that a segregated placement was the LRE for a child who disrupted the 
regular classroom by having tantrums, assaulting students and teachers, and randomly 
leaving the classroom). 
 278. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27 (2016) (“The court shall not modify or 
amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the 
established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and 
convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that states must adhere to at least a clear and 
convincing evidence burden of proof for termination of parental rights). 
 279. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.  
 280. See § 722.27. 
 281. Compare § 1412(a)(5)(A) (stating that students with disabilities cannot 
be removed from regular classroom unless education in that classroom is essentially 
impossible), with § 722.27 (explaining that a child cannot be removed from an 
established custodial environment without clear and convincing evidence to support 
removal). 
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If schools believe a student with disabilities negatively impacts 
other students in the regular classroom, schools must still make every 
practical effort to continue educating that student in the regular 
classroom until that student negatively impacts other students’ 
academic performance.282 However, schools must consider the social 
benefits of mainstreaming on students with disabilities and students 
without disabilities.283 Schools should weigh these benefits with the 
alleged burdens in determining whether removal from the regular 
classroom is truly in each student’s best interest by clear and 
convincing evidence.284  
b. Removal from the Regular Classroom 
If schools decide to remove students with disabilities from the 
regular classroom, the next option should be educating those students 
partially in the regular classroom and partially in a resource room in 
the same building.285 However, if any education in the regular 
classroom is infeasible, based on clear and convincing evidence,286 the 
next option should be educating students in a self-contained classroom 
in the same building.287 If students are to be educated in the same 
school they would attend if they were not disabled, then education in 
a self-contained classroom in an entirely separate building without 
further inquiry seemingly violates IDEA.288 Students should not be 
segregated to a separate building unless they pose such a disruption to 
students in the main building that the school would not be able to 
achieve any order or goals relating to its educational methodology.289 
                                                   
 282. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (stating that children with disabilities are not to be 
removed from regular classrooms unless the “nature or severity” of the child’s 
disability makes education in “regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services” impossible). This negative impact can include excessive modifications to 
the regular classroom. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 652. 
 283. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 617 (explaining Congress’s beliefs about the 
benefits of mainstreaming on both nondisabled students and students with 
disabilities). 
 284. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (providing the standard for removing a child from 
the regular classroom). 
 285. See, e.g., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL, supra note 10, § 11:87 (explaining the range of LRE placements). 
 286. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 287. See, e.g., supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 288. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(c) (2018) (“Unless the IEP of a child with a 
disability requires some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school that he 
or she would attend if nondisabled . . . .”).  
 289. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (providing the standard for removing a child from 
the regular classroom); e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 129 (discussing one 
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This burden should be high considering IDEA’s preference for 
mainstreaming.290  
Further, the cost of educating students with disabilities in the 
main building should not be a factor in separating students from the 
regular classroom because cost does not relate to any educational goal 
or methodology.291 While taxpayers may take issue with the costs of 
special education,292 IDEA is supposed to remediate the profound 
exclusion of students with disabilities from education.293 Cost is not a 
proper reason to justify the exclusion that IDEA was enacted to 
correct.294 Also, no person can be denied constitutional rights based on 
greater expenses incurred by the exercise of those rights.295 Because 
constitutional due process requires schools to focus on individual 
children’s specific needs,296 the expenses of those individual needs do 
not justify a school’s exclusion of students with disabilities.297 
c. Removal from the Regular Building 
Once a school determines by clear and convincing evidence that 
students with disabilities must be segregated from the main building, 
                                                   
scholar’s belief that school districts must support segregated programs “as reasonable 
choices of educational methodology”). 
 290. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 113 (describing the “presumptive 
preference” for mainstreaming students with disabilities based on § 1412(a)(5)(A)). 
 291. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 631, 655 (explaining that if a school fails to 
provide a continuum of services, it cannot use cost as a defense, and that denying 
inclusion based on incremental cost increases would violate IDEA’s mainstreaming 
mandate). But see Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 129 (discussing one scholar’s 
proposed LRE test that includes cost effectiveness as a factor of educational 
methodology).  
 292. For detailed cost analyses, see generally COLORADO COSTING OUT 
STUDY, supra note 55; MICHIGAN EDUCATION, supra note 55; PENNSYLVANIA’S 
PUBLIC EDUCATION GOALS, supra note 55. 
 293. See Crockett, supra note 25, at 545 (discussing how Congress enacted 
IDEA to remedy the exclusion of “millions of children from public instruction based 
solely upon their disabilities”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 603 (explaining that in 1969, 
“only seven states were educating more than fifty-one percent of their disabled 
children”). 
 294. See Crockett, supra note 25, at 545 (discussing how Congress enacted 
IDEA to remedy the exclusion of children with disabilities). 
 295. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) (citing 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1969)) (explaining that costs do not justify 
exclusion of special education students). 
 296. See Romberg, supra note 131, at 446 (explaining the two layers of due 
process under IDEA—the due process hearing and due process in the formation of 
IEPs). 
 297. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266) 
(explaining that costs do not justify exclusion of special education students).  
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that school must mainstream those students in every possible 
nonacademic activity.298 Students with disabilities should, at a 
minimum, be able to participate in lunch, recess, art, gym, and 
music.299 Schools can transport students to the main building for any 
mainstreaming with nondisabled peers.300 Mainstreaming in these 
nonacademic areas would not affect how teachers treat students with 
disabilities because teachers would not be influenced by any effects 
on test scores.301 Thus, parents could still feel comfortable with their 
children in the mainstream for nonacademic activities.302 Additionally, 
based on several scholarly and judicial opinions noting the importance 
of same-age peer interactions, mainstreaming for students with 
disabilities must occur amongst same-age, nondisabled students.303  
Through mainstreaming, both students with disabilities and 
nondisabled students can learn from each other.304 Nondisabled 
                                                   
 298. See 7 C.F.R. § 15b.23(b) (2018) (“In providing or arranging for the 
provision of nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities, including meals, 
recess periods, and the services and activities set forth in § 15b.26(a)(2), a recipient 
shall ensure that handicapped persons participate with nonhandicapped persons in 
such activities and services to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the 
handicapped person in question.”); Farley, supra note 79, at 818 (“Furthermore, if 
students with disabilities cannot be included in a regular class for academic work, then 
they should participate in non-academic activities to the maximum extent appropriate. 
For example, a student should be allowed to join his or her regular education 
classmates for activities like meals and recess periods. In doing so, a student with a 
disability can maintain contact with non-disabled peers to the maximum extent 
appropriate to the needs of that child . . . . [I]f a student with a disability is segregated, 
he or she must still be included with regular peers for non-academic activities like 
lunch and recess to the maximum extent appropriate.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 299. See Farley, supra note 79, at 818 (discussing some nonacademic 
alternatives to mainstreaming).  
 300. See, e.g., Jason O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744, 
772 (N.D. Ill. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. Ostby v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 
114, 851 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the school would transport students 
with a van to the main building in cases of inclement weather). 
 301. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (explaining the potential 
influence of test scores on teachers’ decisions about special education). 
 302. See id. (noting teachers’ implicit biases and parents’ fears). 
 303. See Tucker v. Calloway Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 
1998) (explaining the need for integration of same-age peers); Gillette v. Fairland Bd. 
of Educ., 932 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991) (providing some evidence that same-age 
peer interactions are valuable in partial mainstreaming); Sch. Dist. v. Grover, 755 F. 
Supp. 243, 247 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (discussing how “it was essential for [a student’s] 
social development that she interact with age-appropriate non-handicapped peers.”); 
Farley, supra note 79, at 818 (discussing the need to maximize mainstreaming in 
nonacademic activities); Osborne, Jr., supra note 39, at 446 (explaining the need for 
mainstreaming in nonacademic activities). 
 304. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 657-58 (describing the benefits of 
mainstreaming that apply to students without disabilities); see also Daniel R.R. v. 
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children provide language and behavior modeling for their peers with 
disabilities, even in nonacademic settings.305 At a minimum, students 
with disabilities can inspire their peers, and they can inform their 
peers, even indirectly, about the types of disabilities that those children 
will encounter beyond the classroom.306 
d. Arbitrary Building Segregation 
Sometimes, a school simply does not have room in its main 
building for all of its self-contained special education students, such 
as in the Smith Elementary school example.307 However, if those 
students do not need to be separated from their same-age peers by an 
entire building based on the aforementioned standards,308 the school 
must equally distribute its classrooms among the buildings so that 
special education students are not arbitrarily separated from their 
same-age peers.309 This distribution of classrooms should include a 
relatively equal number of regular classrooms of each grade level and 
self-contained classrooms in each building.310 Despite these proposed 
solutions, some schools would likely still struggle to obtain proper 
funding to implement any changes.311 Regardless, under IDEA, 
students with disabilities need meaningful opportunities to interact 
with their same-age peers; sending twelve-year-old students with 
                                                   
State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing the benefits 
of mainstreaming that apply to disabled students). 
 305. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047-48 (discussing the importance of 
language and behavior modeling for students with disabilities from their nondisabled 
peers in any educational environmental). 
 306. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 657-58 (describing the ways that 
mainstreaming students with disabilities can inspire and educate their nondisabled 
peers). 
 307. See Interview with Heather Hall, supra note 3 (providing the basis for the 
Smith Elementary School example). 
 308. See supra Subsections I.A.1-I.A.3 (describing three LRE tests). 
 309. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (providing mainstreaming 
requirements); Tucker, 136 F.3d at 506 (describing one child’s needs for “integration 
with peers of his own age”); Gillette, 932 F.2d at 554 (providing some evidence that 
same-age peer interactions are valuable in partial mainstreaming). 
 310. See § 1412(a)(5)(A). An equal distribution of regular classrooms and 
special education classroom in a separate building would comport with IDEA because 
the students could still be mainstreamed. See id. 
 311. See, e.g., Background of Special Education, supra note 55 (discussing the 
financial realities of special education and the federal government’s inability to meet 
the proposed funding amounts). 
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disabilities into a building of only kindergarten students would violate 
IDEA.312 
While this new test could impact school policy decisions, due 
process and IDEA’s mainstreaming requirements should outweigh 
school convenience.313 Individualized analyses would prevent schools 
from making arbitrary placement decisions based on factors other than 
reasonable educational methodology.314 By maximizing mainstream, 
same-age peer interactions in academic and nonacademic activities, 
schools would not only benefit students with disabilities, but they 
would also benefit nondisabled students by providing them with a 
deeper understanding of their peers.315 
CONCLUSION 
IDEA mandates that students with disabilities be educated in 
their least restrictive environments.316 These environments are a 
continuum of placements that must meet every individual students’ 
needs.317 Some placements include segregated environments from the 
general education classrooms, and some placements include 
segregated classrooms from the general education buildings like 
Smith Elementary School; however, schools cannot conflate the two 
environments as equivalent LRE placements.318  
Schools cannot remove students from mainstream environments 
with their same-age peers unless those students cannot possibly 
receive an education in the general building in a self-contained 
classroom.319 If schools violate this proposed principle, they should be 
                                                   
 312. See, e.g., Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[T]he district court’s finding that the School District has not taken meaningful steps 
to try to include [the student] in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and 
services is not clearly erroneous.”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 652 (explaining that 
reasonable modifications are important to give students with disabilities “meaningful 
access” to education, but noting that modification is unreasonable if it unduly burdens 
students). 
 313. See US CONST. amend. XIV; § 1412(a)(5)(A) (explaining the need to 
mainstream students with disabilities). 
 314. See Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 129 (“[T]he Court should require that 
school districts support their decisions to offer only segregated or centralized 
programs as reasonable choices of educational methodology.”). 
 315. See Melvin, supra note 2, at 617 (explaining Congress’s beliefs about the 
benefits of mainstreaming on both nondisabled students and students with 
disabilities). 
 316. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (enacting the LRE mandate). 
 317. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE MANUAL, 
supra note 10, § 11:87 (defining the continuum of placements). 
 318. See id.; Moor, supra note 229 (explaining the levels of placements). 
 319. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (explaining the threshold for removal). 
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liable for placement malpractice and damages to the student and his or 
her family.320 The Supreme Court should create a universal LRE test 
that better comports with IDEA’s intent to properly mainstream 
students with disabilities.321 Without a proper Supreme Court test, 
children with disabilities will continue to suffer from improper 
educational segregation.322 A Supreme Court test can help implement 
IDEA’s curative purpose, but the Supreme Court will never be able to 
do enough to correct the former wrongs against children with 
disabilities.323 
                                                   
 320. See Wolf, supra note 142, at 446 (describing the concept of placement 
malpractice). 
 321. See supra Subsection IV.B.2 (detailing a potential LRE test). 
 322. See Crockett, supra note 25, at 545 (discussing how Congress enacted 
IDEA to remedy the exclusion of “millions of children from public instruction based 
solely upon their disabilities”); Melvin, supra note 2, at 603 (explaining that in 1969, 
only a few states were educating more than half of their children with disabilities). 
 323. See Crockett, supra note 25, at 545; Melvin, supra note 2, at 603. 
